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Abstract
Verication of sequential programs is hard. Verication of concurrent programs
is even harder because it involves considering the possibility of thread interference in
addition to the complexity of sequential reasoning.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a methodology for the automated veri-
cation of the multi-threaded and object-oriented HARPO/L language. A verication
methodology is presented which allows verifying a program based on its contracts.
In particular, it gaurantees data-race-freedom, verication of data invariants (i.e. ab-
sence of data corruption), and, to the extent that the pre- and postconditions specify
it, correctness of the interface to shared objects. The methodology is built based
on implicit dynamic frames with fractional permissions. A specication language
is developed based on this methodology to allow programmers to express their de-
sign decisions formally. The verication technique is based on verication-condition
generation and automated theorem proving. A translation from HARPO/L to the
intermediate verication language, Boogie, is provided in the thesis. The e¢ cacy of
this approach is demonstrated by translating several examples to Boogie and using
automated verication on the translation.
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Chapter 0
Introduction
0.0 Motivation
The roots of formal verication are in the observation that computer programs can be
viewed as mathematical objects with well-determined behaviour [2][3]. In principle,
computer programing is considered an exact science in that all the properties of
the program and all the results of executing it can be understood from the text of
program [1]. As a result, the programs can be modeled as mathematical objects and
their correctness can be proved by mathematical methods.
Building reliable software is one of the main goals of engineering. In fact, a
program is considered correct if all the design requirements are met by the program
[1]. The reality is that programs show errors and it is essential to nd errors in the
early stages. One of common techniques to achieve this is testing and debugging in
which some test cases are performed by user. The fact is, testing takes a considerable
time of software projects and they cannot guarantee correctness because tests cover
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a limited set of execution cases and testing all cases is infeasible [4]. Given the
limitations of testing, more precise approaches are required.
Formal methods have been developed to check the correctness of programs. There
have been many advances in formal verications and several approaches have been de-
veloped. One standard approach is generating a collection of logical proof obligations,
verication conditions, from the program and its specication where the validity of
verication conditions implies the correctness of the program. Then, the verication
conditions are processed with a theorem prover. Generating verication conditions
for high-level programming languages is a complex task. Therefore, this task is split
in two steps: First, a transformation of the program into an intermediate verication
language (for example, Boogie [5]), and then, a transformation of the intermediate
language program into the logical formulas. This methodology creates a level of
abstraction over the logical formulas passed to the theorem prover [5].
Reasoning about sequential object-oriented programs is hard, due to aliasing,
dynamic binding, modularity and implicit assumptions. Reasoning about concur-
rent programs is even harder because of data races and possible interference among
threads. Therefore, developers must not only consider assumptions for reasoning
about sequential programs, they have to consider the e¤ects of other threads. Fur-
thermore, mainstream concurrent programs apply advanced concurrency patterns to
increase the performance and exibility of programs. They use ne-grained locking
and concurrent reading to increase parallelism. These patterns make reasoning about
concurrent programs more complicated.
1
0.1 Objectives
In this thesis, we present a verication methodology for the multi-threaded and object-
oriented HARPO/L [6] programming language. Our approach is based on implicit
dynamic frames [7] with Boylands fractional permissions [8]. The cornerstone of
our methodology is preventing data races. Our approach supports object invariants,
rendezvous and ne-grained concurrency. A specication language is developed based
on this methodology, which is exible and allows modular verication.
Based on our methodology, a translation from HARPO/L to an intermediate
verication language, Boogie, is provided. Each HARPO/L programming construct
is encoded to Boogie and an example is implemented for each case. In the end, some
challenging algorithms are specied and veried by this approach.
0.2 Outline
The remaining of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides a background
on formal verication and some notable verication methodologies are introduced.
In chapter 2, background on HARPO/L and the Boogie intermediate verication
language is presented. Chapter 3 describes our verication methodology and speci-
cation language. Chapter 4 presents translation of HARPO/L to Boogie language
based on our methodology. It includes some examples to show the technical details of
translation. In chapter 5, some complex case studies are presented and veried with
Boogie. Finally, a conclusion of the thesis with discussion of future work is presented
in chapter 6.
2
Chapter 1
Background on Formal Verication
Formal verication is the process of checking the correctness of programs with for-
mal methods of mathematics. One of the rst methodologies was developed by
C. A. R. Hoare; it is based on deductive reasoning to generate formal proofs of
correctness. One main challenge is the frame problem, the problem of formalizing the
parts of the heap that remain unchanged by an operation. Since Hoare logic, many
studies have been done to solve frame problem. Some of notable proposed method-
ologies are Separation Logic, Dynamic Frames and Implicit Dynamic Frames which
will be discussed in this chapter.
1.0 Hoare Logic
Hoare logic [1] provides a logical basis for reasoning about program correctness. The
technique is based on deductive reasoning; it applies sets of valid axioms and valid
rules of inference to prove the properties of programs.
Programs are developed based on the design requirements, and it is critical that
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programs implement the expected behaviour. To prove this property, the require-
ments can be specied by making explicit assertions about the values of variables at
the end of the program execution and to check whether the implementation conforms
to specications. Furthermore, correctness of a program can depend on the initial
values of the variables and these conditions can be specied by assertions too. To
formalize this concept, Hoare logic introduced Hoare triples. Each Hoare triple states
the connection between a program (Q) and its precondition (P ) and postcondition
(R) with following form:
P fQg R (1.0)
The meaning is, if the precondition P is true in initial state, the postcondition,
R, will hold after the execution of program Q. This is a partial correctness statement
because termination is not considered in Hoare logic.
The assertions are expressed in mathematical notations and the correctness of
program is proved by applying axioms and rules. The selection of sets of axioms
depends on the properties of the target programming language. Hoare logic was
originally developed for a simple imperative language and its axioms and rules cover
elementary operations such as addition and multiplication. It also provides inference
rules for simple program constructs including assignment, consequence and iteration.
For instance, assignment is one of the main features of a programming language.
Considering the assignment x := ethe related inference rule is:
P [e=x] fx := eg P (1.1)
where x is a variable identier, P is the postcondition and the precondition P [e=x] is
the formula P after substituting e for all free occurrences of x. For example, for the
4
command x := 5, the following Hoare triple is correct.
true fx := 5g x == 5
1.0.0 The Frame Problem
Generally, specications express two kinds of requirements, One is functional require-
ment describing what type of change is done on the variable and the other is framing
requirement describing which variables are allowed to be changed by the statement
and other variables are remained unchanged [9]. For instance, considering the previ-
ous example, if there is variable y in the program, the postcondition must assert that
variable y is not changed by the program:
y == 2 fx := 5g x == 5 ^ y == 2
The problem with this approach is scalability: for large programs, reasoning about
all locations una¤ected by a command is a tedious task. This is one of the challenges
of writing specication and it is called the framing problem.
Moreover, Hoare logic does not consider heap reasoning with aliasing probability.
For example, assuming x and y are two variables containing two addresses of a heap,
the following statement is not valid because x and y can point to same address. Note
that [x] is the dereference of x.
[y] == 2 f[x] := 5g [x] == 5 ^ [y] == 2
To make it valid, we can add another condition, emphasizing x and y are not
equal.
[y] == 2 ^ x 6= y f[x] := 5g [x] == 5 ^ [y] == 2
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The reasoning about una¤ected locations in heap reasoning has scalability prob-
lems too. Many approaches have been developed to deal with the framing problem:
they will be explained in the following sections.
1.1 Separation Logic
Separation logic [10] is an extension of Hoare logic to reason about low-level imperative
programs that use pointers. It extends the assertions of Hoare logic with predicates
describing the heap and introduces new logical operations to express disjointness of
heaps and aliasing. The main idea of separation logic is based on spatial conjuction,
asserting that its sub-formulas hold for disjoint portions of the heap. These extensions
allow a concise way to axiomatize pointer operations.
1.1.0 Assertions in Separation Logic
Assertions express the changes on states. States are expressed by two components,
a store and a heap. Intuitively, stores describe the content of registers and a heap
describes the content of an addressable memory [10]. A store is modeled by a function
mapping variables into values, and a heap is modeled with a partial function mapping
addresses to values. Two heaps are considered disjoint if they have separate domains.
An empty heap is shown by emp and a singleton heap with address x and value e is
shown as x 7! e.
The central idea of separation logic is based on a separating conjuction, P  Q,
that asserts that P and Q hold for disjoint parts of heap. A closely related assertion
is a separating implication, P  Q. This logic asserts that extending the heap with
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a disjoint part that satises P results in a new heap that satises Q.
1.1.1 The Frame Rule
Separation logic improved Hoare logic by adding new inference rules. To deal with
the frame problem, a new rule, with the name of frame rule [11] is introduced:
fPg C fQg
fP Rg C fQ Rg (1.2)
where no free variable in R is modied by C. This rule says that it is possible to
reason and assert locally about program C and then extend it to specications with
variables and locations which are not modied by C. This property is called local
reasoning [11]. The idea of local reasoning is that there are many resources in a
program, but a statement can work on variables or locations that it has access to and
so any initially true conditions involving una¤ected locations remain true.
Using the framing rule, extending local specications is possible. For instance,
the previous example can be updated as follows:
fx! _  y ! 2g [x] := 5 fx! 5  y ! 2g
The possibility of aliasing is removed, and the statement is valid.
1.2 Dynamic Frames
Dynamic frames [9] were developed by Kassios to deal with the frame problem for
object-oriented programs. Object-oriented programs introduce new issues such as
modularity and encapsulation where previous approaches for verication were de-
signed for non-modular programs.
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To illustrate the problem, suppose that program Q is x := 1. We also assume
that the program has another variable y. The strongest postcondition must have two
assertions: First, the new value of x is one. Second, no other variable changes. As a
result, the postcondition will be as the following code:
x == 1 ^ y == old(y)
Such reasoning is not possible in modular programs because, at the time of writing
the specication of a module, we do not know all variables, and depending on clients,
the program may have di¤erent variables.
1.2.0 Modular specications
Modularity [12] is rst introduced by object-oriented programs where a program is
divided into independent modules. The advantage of modularity is that any change
in a module only a¤ects that module, and there is no need to modify other modules.
Consequently, designers of program verication systems have used the modularity
concept for program correctness. The idea is that specications can be written for
each module separately, and modules can be veried separately too. Furthermore,
modication of a module a¤ects only the proof of that module. Using modular spec-
ication, the specication for the previous example is:
ensures x == 1 modies x
The meaning is that the value of variable x is one and the program only modies
variable x, so the specication does not mention about other program variables.
The other property of object-oriented programs is encapsulation, which makes
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class Cell {
private int x;
pure int getX()
{ return x; }
void setX(int value)
{ x := value; }
}
Figure 1.0: A class Cell
writing specications more complicated. Encapsulation means the data representa-
tion of the implementation is hidden from clients, and as a result, the specication
must be written without mentioning hidden elds. Figure 1.0 shows an encapsulated
implementation. The variable x is a private eld and clients cannot observe it. Clients
can access eld x only via setX and getX.
Dynamic frame theory introduced abstract variables to be able to reason about
encapsulated data. Abstract variables are di¤erent from program variables and are
only used to reason about hidden elds. In fact, they are used to create a connection
between concrete state and the abstract state which is visible to clients. To further
simplify this approach, pure functions are introduced. A pure function computes a
result based on hidden state and has no e¤ect on the state of program. Pure functions
are members of a class and are allowed to be invoked in specications [12].
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class Cell {
private int x;
pure int getX()
reads footprint();
{ return x; }
void setX(int value)
modies footprint();
ensures getX() == value;
{ x := value; }
pure set footprint()
{ return {&x}; }
}
Figure 1.1: A class Cell with dynamic frames
1.2.1 Dynamic Frames Implementation
Dynamic frame theory is an approach to specify the footprint [12] of statements in
an abstract way. A footprint is a set of locations which is accessed by a method or
function. Footprints are encoded by pure functions which are called dynamic frames.
Moreover, methods and functions are specied by those pure functions. Now, the
previous example can be annotated using pure functions as shown in gure 1.1.
The pure function footprint is the footprint of class C. The method setX is an-
notated by modies clause; means the method setX is allowed to access the elds
returning by footprint. Furthermore, the function getX is annotated by reads clause;
meaning it only depends on elds returning by footprint.
This approach solves the frame problem by allowing specications to explicitly
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declare the part of the heap they may modify, by functions of the heap. It guarantees
that when a variable is changed, the other frames that are disjoint from the frame
of the changed variable remained unchanged. The computed frames are considered
dynamic because the returning values of these functions may change as the heap is
modied [13].
1.3 Implicit Dynamic Frames
The Dynamic frames methodology is a powerful and exible way to specify and verify
object-oriented programs. However, it requires that frame annotations be written for
each method, and be checked at verication time. Implicit dynamic frames tackles
this problem by introducing a new specication style with access permissions, which
eliminates the need to explicitly write and check the frame annotations. Instead, the
frame information can be inferred implicitly from specications. The new annotations
are more concise and discharge fewer proof obligations [7].
The role of access assertions is to represent permission to access a location. A
method can access a memory location if it has permission to do so. The permissions
required by the precondition implicitly dene the upper bound of locations modied
by the method.
Accessibility to location x is denoted by acc(x). Suppose a method needs to read
or write a memory location; in order to be allowed to do so, the location must be
accessible by the methods precondition. Consequently, the location will be accessible
during execution of the method. Figure 1.2 shows an example of implicit dynamic
frames.
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class Cell {
Cell()
ensures acc(x) /n x = 0;
{ this.x := 0; }
void setX(int v)
requires acc(x);
ensures acc(x) /n x = v;
{ x := v;}
}
Figure 1.2: A class Cell with implicit dynamic frames
The method setX modies x, so its precondition requires accessibility of location
x. In other words, acc(x) in precondition transfers permission to access x from the
caller to the callee and acc(x) in the postcondition returns permission to the caller.
Similarly, the constructor changes the elds of the new object and does not require
access permission because when a new object is created, the permission is transferred
from the system to the constructor.
This approach solves the frame problem for modular programs. The method can
be improved to support data abstraction. Pure methods are introduced to have data
abstraction; pure methods are side-e¤ect free methods that can be used in contracts
and expressions. There are two kinds of pure methods: normal pure methods and
predicates. A normal pure method abstracts over an expression, while a predicate ab-
stracts over an assertion. The previous example can be improved by hiding permission
on eld x as shown in gure 1.3.
The predicate valid and the pure method getX are added. Instead of directly using
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class Cell {
Cell()
ensures valid() /n getX() = 0;
{ this.x := 0; }
void setX(int v)
requires valid();
ensures valid() /n getX() = v;
{ x := v;}
predicate bool valid()
{ return acc(x); }
pure int getX()
requires valid();
{ return x; }
}
Figure 1.3: A class Cell with data abstaction
the access permission, the predicate valid is called in method contracts. Predicates
are self-framing and valid does not have preconditions. The pure method getX has a
precondition that requires access on location x. Since pure methods never modify the
state, the return value of getX only depends on locations required to be accessible by
its precondition.
1.4 Verication of Concurrent Programs
Multiprocessor computers allow multiple application programs to execute simulta-
neously or a single program to execute on multiple processors using multithreading
[14]. Multithreading improves the performance and exibility of programs, but also
13
complicates reasoning. Reasoning about sequential object-oriented programs is hard,
due to aliasing, implicit assumptions and modularity. Reasoning about concurrent
programs is even harder due to their having more complicated behaviour.
A concurrent program consists of multiple processes (computations) executing to-
gether to perform a task. Threads are processes in a shared resources system. The
characteristics of multithreaded programs make it hard to write correct programs.
First of all, the scheduling of threads is non-deterministic, which makes it di¢ cult
to test or reproduce the behaviour to nd errors. Secondly, reasoning about multi-
threaded programs is complicated since the interference of other threads has to be
considered. In particular, threads can access a shared resource simultaneously [15].
1.4.0 Properties of Concurrent Programs
To verify the correctness of concurrent programs, two essentially kinds of properties
of the program must be proved: safety properties and liveness properties. A safety
property states that something bad can not happen. For example, partial correctness
is a safety property. It means that the program can not stop in an incorrect state. A
liveness property states that something good will eventually happen. Program ter-
mination is an example of liveness property. Verifying concurrent programs requires
techniques to prove safety and liveness properties [16].
One important category of safety properties ismutual exclusion [14]. It states that
no two processes are in their critical sections at the same time. Mutual exclusion can
be used to avoid data races. The problem of data races will be discussed in the next
part and then it will be explained how to implement mutual exclusion to avoid data
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races.
Data Race
A data race happens when two threads access a shared memory location concur-
rently and one of the accesses is a write access. This is problematic if shared data
has to be accessed in a consistent way. For instance, assuming reading and writing
are not atomic, if one thread reads a memory location while the other one is trying
to write, the thread might read a corrupt value. Also, if two threads try to change a
memory location simultaneously, the resulting value can be corrupted. An example
data race is the following program:
x := x+ 1 jj x := x+ 2
Two threads compete to access a shared variable. The meaning of statements is
dependent on the ordering of interleaving and also the granularity of operations [17]. If
each of the assignment statements is an atomic action then there are two interleaving
of actions and two results are possible. If the assignment command consists of two or
more atomic actions, then more interleavings and results are possible [18].
Data race is a programming error. It is very di¢ cult to detect data races by
testing techniques. In fact, race freedom is a basic building block for writing and
verifying multithreaded programs. Race free programs guarantee desired behaviours
of programs and free us from considering the details of interleaving and granularity
[17]. Data races can be avoided by properly synchronizing process interactions. One
way to avoid data race is to have mutual exclusion groups in critical sections.
Mutual Exclusion
In a shared memory system, synchronization allows controlled communication be-
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tween threads. Mutual exclusion groups are a common way to synchronize concurrent
threads. A mutual exclusion group is a set of commands such that not more than
one command in the group can be executing at once [17]. This approach greatly
simplies writing and reasoning about concurrent programs by eliminating the need
to consider the details of interleavings and granularity. A standard way to achieve
mutual exclusion is to use locks. A lock ensures that one or more sections of code is
not executed concurrently by multiple threads by requiring threads to rst acquire
the lock and if it was held by another thread, the requesting thread will wait until it
becomes available. Locks can be ne-grained or coarse-grained [14].
Traditional concurrent implementations use coarse-grained locking in which a sin-
gle lock is used to guard an entire data structure, such as a linked list or a tree [19].
This approach eliminates inconsistent executions and reasoning is fairly easy. How-
ever, it limits concurrency. For instance, modifying an element of a tree requires that
the entire data structure be locked. This reduces parallelism and it is more e¢ cient
to lock only the elements which are required.
Fine-grained locking allows more concurrency by allowing multiple threads to work
on same data structure simultaneously. This technique associates each object with
its own lock and threads working in di¤erent parts of a data structure do not need to
exclude each other. For instance, each node of a tree could be protected by its own
lock. In this approach, atomicity is achieved by acquiring a set of locks instead of a
single lock [19]. This approach can have higher e¢ ciency but complicates reasoning
about concurrent programs.
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1.4.1 Verication Methodology for Concurrent Programs
The verication methodology for concurrent programs has to support the complica-
tions of accessing the memory by multiple threads. In particular, it has to rule out
data races and support multiple readers and ne-grained locking [19]. Implicit dy-
namic frame theory can handle the data race issue. However, it only supports full
access permission, meaning a thread either can read and write a memory location or
it does not have any permission at all. As a result, if a thread only reads a memory
location, it must have full access. Instead, we can think of two types of permission:
write permission and read permission. Write permission must be unique but read
permission can have multiple copies excluding any write permission. One way to
have multiple concurrent readers and ne-grained locking is fractional permissions
[8]. Extending implicit dynamic frames with fractional permissions enables verifying
concurrent programs. Chalice [19], a language and verier for concurrent programs
implements a similar approach.
1.4.2 Fractional Permission
Fractional permission [8] is a popular approach in reasoning about concurrent pro-
grams. It can prevent data races while allowing multiple readers. The model asso-
ciates one (whole) permission to each memory location and the whole permission is
needed to modify the memory location. Permission can be held or transferred between
threads and objects. Also, permissions can split into fractions. A non-zero fraction is
required to read a memory location. This allows multiple readers. Finally, fractions
can be joined back together, and when all readers have returned their fractions, it
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class Cell {
var a, sum : int;
method Add()
requires acc(sum, 1) /n acc(a, 0.5)
ensures acc(sum, 1) /n acc(a, 0.5)
{ sum := sum + a; }
}
Figure 1.4: A class Cell with fractional permissions
is possible to write the memory location. Fractional permission can only be trans-
ferred, split or combined, but never duplicated. As a result, at most one thread can
have write permission at a time and sum of permissions of threads for each location
is one whole permission. This property ensures race freedom and allows arbitrary
concurrent reads [20].
To verify modular concurrent programs, fractional permissions can be combined
with implicit dynamic frames. In this solution, permissions are abstractly a quan-
tity between 0 and 1. A permission of 1 means the thread has write permission and
any non-zero permission means the thread has read permission. Each method spec-
ies its required permission in its precondition and the returning permission in its
postcondition. Figure 1.4 shows an example of fractional permissions.
The method Add requires full permission for the location sum and read permission
for the location a. The execution thread must have full permission for location sum
and at least 0.5 permission for location a. Upon a call to Add, the required permissions
are transferred from the caller to the callee and after the call, the permissions specied
in the postcondition transfer from the callee to the caller.
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Chapter 2
Background on HARPO/L and
Boogie
In this chapter, technical background about the HARPO/L programming language
and the Boogie language, which will be needed in the following chapters, is presented.
2.0 HARPO/L
2.0.0 Introduction
Digital hardware has improved rapidly regarding speed, density and e¢ ciency making
it possible to implement applications on Integrated Circuits (ICs). ICs can be divided
in three groups, non-programmable ICs such as traditional ASICs, programmable ICs
such as microprocessors, and recongurable hardware such as FPGAs and CGRAs.
Abstract designing methods, free of implementation technology, allow to deal with a
wide range of implementations. The HARPO/L language is designed to achieve this
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objective [21].
Application-Specic Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are designed for a particular use,
and operate on a high performance level. However, they have low exibility and any
modication leads to redesign of the whole circuit. In contrast to ASICs are micro-
processors. Microprocessors are general purpose systems with xed hardware, which
can be programmed for many applications. They have lower e¢ ciency than non-
programmable ICs but higher exibility. Recongurable architectures are the modern
technologies which ll the gap between nonprogrammable hardware and microproces-
sors. Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are ne-grain recongurable archi-
tectures and microprocessors. Their architecture consists of recongurable blocks
and recongurable interconnections at bit level which can be congured by the user.
FPGAs have the advantage of high exibility, but due to their ne-grained structure
they can have low performance. On the other hand, Coarse-Grained Recongurable
Architectures (CGRAs) have higher performance. They have word length processing
units which overcome the performance issues of FPGAs [22].
HARPO/L is a behavioral language to create hardware congurations for a wide
range of platforms including congurable hardware and microprocessors. The lan-
guage is object oriented, supporting parallel and concurrent computing. However, to
support hardware characteristics, it has features which make it di¤erent from typical
high-level programing languages.
The rst di¤erence is the representation of objects. In hardware implementation,
an object is represented by a concrete block of gates which is congured at construc-
tion time. As a result, all objects in HARPO/L are formed statically at conguration
time and there is no dynamic memory allocation. Also, the connections between
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objects are generated at conguration time and, consequently, there is no reference
assignment in HARPO/L. The second di¤erence is the implementation of methods;
in hardware, a method call is a set of gates and connections which implements the
body of a method. As a result, HARPO/L does not allow multiple threads to work
on the same method concurrently. Finally, hardware is inherently parallel and allows
higher level of parallelism than microprocessors. To support this feature, HARPO/L
has a co statement which allows explicit parallelism [23].
The features of HARPO/L language are introduced in this section. This section
is based on [6].
2.0.1 Primitive types
Primitive types are build-in types. In HARPO/L, the primitive types are scalar
types including Integer, Real and Boolean. Integral and real types are represented in
di¤erent ranges, as follows
Integer: int8, int16, int32, and int64
Real: real16, real32, real64
Objects of primitive types can be assigned several times. Shorter types are sub-
types of longer ones. Therefore, the shorter types can be assigned to variables with
longer types and the type of an expression is determined by the longer type.
2.0.2 Arrays
An array is a collection of locations or objects with same type. In HARPO/L, arrays
are single-dimensional and have xed sizes. The language allows to have an array of
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arrays too. An array is dened as follows:
ArrayDecl ! obj Name [ : Type] := ArrayInit
ArrayInit ! (for Name : Bounds do InitExp [for]) (2.0)
Each item has a position called its index and can be accessed by the name of object
and the index of the item.
2.0.3 Classes and Fields
Classes are the basic construct in HARPO/L. Classes can be instantiated several
times to create objects, but objects cannot be assigned after initialization. Class
members include elds, methods, and threads. Each class has one constructor. The
constructor parameters can be either constants with keyword in, or objects to which
this object is connected with keyword obj.
ClassDecl ! (class Name GParams? (CParam+;) (implements Type+;)?
(ClassMember) [class [Name]]) (2.1)
In the following code, class Adder is declared. Object a with type of the class
is created. Object a is connected with two other objects i and j at compile time.
Moreover, there will be no reassignment to the object a after construction.
(class Adder
constructor(obj i : Int16, obj j : Int16)
public proc Add()
. . . . . .
class)
obj a := new Adder(i, j);
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Fields are objects dened in a class or interface. A eld must have an access
modier. A private eld is accessible inside its class but a public eld can be accessed
by other classes. Fields are declared in the following form:
Field  ! Access? obj Name [ : Type] := InitExp
Access  ! private j public (2.2)
The Type can be omitted; in this case, the type of the object is determined by the
type of InitExp. If the Type is declared by the user, InitExp must have same type as
the object.
2.0.4 Interfaces
In the HARPO/L language, an interface is a type. The members of an interface can
be elds or method declarations. The implementation of a method declaration must
be inside a thread of a class that implements the interface.
IntfDecl ! (interface Name GParams? (extends Type+;)?
(IntfMember) [interface [Name]])
IntfMember ! Field jMethod j ; (2.3)
In the following example, an interface is declared with two public methods.
(interface Bu¤er
public proc put(in value : Int32)
public proc get(out value : Int32)
interface)
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2.0.5 Threads and Blocks
Threads are executable code blocks of a class. Each class has zero or more threads
which are executed as a result of object creation.
Thread! (thread Block [thread]) (2.4)
Threads enable concurrency in an object, with multiple threads processing at the
same time. A block is a sequence of statements:
Block ! CommandBlock j LocalDeclaration j ;Block j (2.5)
2.0.6 Statements
Statements are declared within threads. The grammar of HARPO/L statements are
described in this part.
 Local Variable Declaration
A local variable represents an object with a value. The scope of a local variable
is the block it is declared.
ObjectDecl! obj Name [ : Type] := InitExp (2.6)
 Assignment
In HARPO/L, objects with primitive types are allowed to be assigned. Aditionally,
multiple objects can be assigned at one time. The number of objects must be the
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same as the expressions in the right hand side.
Command ! ObjectIds := Expressions
ObjectIds ! (ObjectId)+;
Expressions ! (Expression)+;
ObjectId ! Name j ObjectId[Expression] j ObjectId:Name (2.7)
 Sequential Control Flows
Sequential control ows are similar to other high-level languages. They include if
statement for alternation, while and for statement for repetition structure.
Command ! (if Expression [then] Block (elseif Expression [then] Block)
(else Block)? [if ])
j (while Expression [do] Block [while])
j (for Name : Bounds [do] Block [for]) (2.8)
 Method Implementation
Methods are used for thread synchronization. A method has a declaration part
in the class and an implementation block located in the thread. A method may have
guard. A guard is a Boolean expression which must be true to execute the method.
command !

accept MethodImp (jMethodImp) [accept]

MethodImp ! Name((Direction Name : Type);) [Guard] Block0 [then Block1]
Direction ! in j out
Guard ! when Expression (2.9)
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Methods in HARPO/L have di¤erent behavior from other high level programming
languages. Because of the hardware specications, HARPO/L methods implement
rendezvous. A method is implemented inside a thread and, when the thread reaches
the accept statement, it waits for a call for one of its implemented methods. Once
there is at least one call and the guard is true, the corresponding method body may
be executed.
In this methodology, one call at a time is served and other calls must wait un-
til the sequential execution ow of the server thread reaches the accept statement.
Furthermore, a thread cannot call a method implemented by itself, as this results a
deadlock. Rendezvous can be used to model other synchronization mechanism such
as semaphores.
 Lock
Locking is a ne grained technique to have data consistency. In concurrent pro-
grams, shared locations may be accessed by several threads at the same time. Accesses
are either read accesses or write accesses. Data access is not necessarily atomic and
takes a span of time. To avoid data inconsistency, while writing to a location, other
read or write accesses must be prevented. Locks are one synchronization mechanism
to have mutual execlusion.
Command!

with Exp [Guard] [do] Block [with]

(2.10)
In this statement, Exp must be an object implementing interface Lock. The guard
is a Boolean expression.
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 Parallelism
The co statement gives the feature of explicit parallelism, with it the programmer
can dene parts of program to be executed concurrently.
Command !

co Block (jjBlock)+ [co]

j

co Name : Bounds [do] Block [co]

(2.11)
In parallel accesses, it is the responsibility of the programmer to ensure data
consistency by using synchronization methods.
2.0.7 Expressions
The grammar of expressions in HARPO/L is as follows:
Exp ! Exp0 (( => j <= j <=> ) Exp0)
Exp0 ! Exp1 ((n= j or) Exp1)
Exp1 ! Exp2 ((=n j and) Exp2)
Exp2 ! Exp3 j not Exp2 j Exp2
Exp3 ! Exp4 (( = j  = j < j _ < j > _ j >) Exp4)
Exp4 ! Exp5 (( + j   ) Exp5)
Exp5 ! Primary (( j = jdiv jmod) Primary)
Primary  ! (Exp) j   Primary j ObjectId (2.12)
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2.1 Boogie
A standard approach to program verication is based on theorem proving techniques.
In this approach, the input program and its specication are transformed to logical
formulas, called verication conditions. The validity of verication conditions shows
the correctness of program. The verication conditions are then passed to a theorem
prover and discharged automatically.
Generating verication conditions is a complex task involving a great number of
decisions. As a result, this task is accomplished in two steps. First, the input pro-
gram and its specications are translated to an intermediate programming language
(Boogie), and then the intermediate-language program is transformed to verication
conditions.
In this section, we give an introduction to Boogie, an intermediate language for
program verication. Boogie is an imperative language, consisting of two types of
declarations: mathematical constructs and imperative constructs. The mathematical
part features types, constants, functions, and axioms. The imperative parts consist
of global variables and procedure declarations. This section outlines the features of
Boogie language. This part is based on [5].
2.1.0 Types
A type is either a built in type or user-dened type. Built-in types consist of primitive
types including int and bool and (possibly polymorphic) map type also known as ar-
ray types. For instance, each individual of the type "[ref ] bool" maps ref individuals
to Booleans.
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Boogie allows type constructors. The following example denes a type constructor
with the name of Multiset and it has one argument.
type Multiset ;
Two instantiations of the Multiset type are Multiset int and Multiset bool.
2.1.1 Functions
Function declarations specify mathematical functions. For instance, the following
code declares a function intended to return the length of an input string.
function length(string) returns(int);
2.1.2 Axioms
Properties of constants and functions are declared by axioms. For example, the
following code declares that the function length returns 10 for every s.
axiom length(s) == 10;
2.1.3 Global variables
Global variables represent components of all states and can be changed by all proce-
dures. They must have distinct names from constants and other global variables. For
example, the following code declares a variable to hold current sum.
var sum : int;
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2.1.4 Execution traces
An execution trace is a nonempty sequence of states. A nite and terminating ex-
ecution trace is called well-behaved program execution. An execution trace which
goes wrong after a nite number of states is called ill-behaved program execution.
If an execution trace continues innitely, it is called diverged and is a well-behaved
nonterminating execution trace.
2.1.5 Procedures and Implementations
A procedure declaration denes sets of execution traces. There are two kinds of
execution traces, caller traces and callee traces. These traces are determined by the
signature and specication of a procedure. For example,
procedure Add();
requires x > 0;
ensures sum > 0;
modies x;
declares a procedure with specications. A procedure can have three types of spec-
ication, precondition, postcondition and modication. A precondition is declared by
requires clause which is a Boolean condition. The caller is responsible to establish
the precondition and the callee can assume it to be true in initial state of execu-
tion trace of procedure execution. A postcondition is declared by an ensures clause
which, is a Boolean condition. The procedure implementation is responsible for es-
tablishing it in nal state of execution trace of procedure, and the caller can assume
the postcondition is true at the time of return. The modies clause species the
potentially modied global variables in the body of procedure implementation. Mul-
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tiple requires or ensures clauses are equal to one requires or ensures clause. Also,
multiple modies clauses are equivalent to one modies clause.
A procedure implementation is a body of code representing a set of execution
traces. For example,
implementation Add (x : int)
f
sum := sum+ x;
g
A procedure implementation is correct if its set of execution traces is a subset of the
execution traces of procedure specication. The postcondition and implementation
body are allowed to use old(E) expression which represents the value of expression
E on entry to the procedure
2.1.6 Statements
Statements are used in procedure implementation. Local variables are declared at the
beginning of procedure implementations followed by statements. Boogie has state-
ments similar to other imperative languages as well as statements for verication and
specication purposes, such as loop invariant syntax, assert, assume and havoc
statements. The grammar of Boogie statements is described in this part.
 Assignment Statement
An assignment modies the value of a list of variables in parallel. First, right-hand
expressions are evaluated and then the mutable variables in left-hand are assigned in
parallel. For example, the following code swaps the value of x and y.
x; y := y; x;
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The statement a[i] := E; is a map update. It changes map variable a so that the
new value maps i to E.
 Assertions and Assumptions
Assertion and assumption are used to encode proof obligations. An assertion
expresses a verication condition which must hold in every well-behaved execution
trace. If the assertion does not hold, the execution goes wrong and it is considered
an error. It can be used to check conditions. For example, in translating of a division
assignment, x = y = z; it may be checked that z is not equal to zero as follows:
assert z 6= 0; x = y = z;
Assumptions hold in every feasible execution trace. In fact, an assume statement
restricts feasible traces. If the assumption holds, it is considered a no-op. If the
assumption does not hold, that trace is considered infeasible and the already taken
steps are removed. Some important uses of assumption are in if statement and the
havoc statement. The assume statement helps the verier to render infeasible traces.
 Havoc
The havoc statement takes a list of variables and assigns arbitrary values to them.
These values are chosen blindly but they are restricted by the types of variables, where
conditions and program axioms. For instance, the following example sets x to a non-
negative value. The axiom declares some properties about the programs constants
and functions.
axiom x >= 0;
: : : :
havoc x;
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The havoc statement operates on entire variable. For instance, to assign arbitrary
value to parts of a mapping variable, a temporary variable may be used.
var tmp : int;
. . . .
havoc tmp;
a[i] := tmp;
It is frequent that havoc is followed by an assume statement. The assume
statement introduces an assumption in the program to be veried. The e¤ect of
assume statement is limiting the value chosen by the havoc statement. For example,
the following code sets x so as to satisfy the condition 0 <= x.
havoc x; assume 0 <= x;
 Label Statements and Jumps
A label statement indicates a program point. It can be used with goto and
break statements. A goto statement transfers the control of the program to the
specied label. A goto statement can have more than one label where the choice
between them is done randomly. The specied labels by goto must reside in the
same implementation body. The following example shows a goto statement.
i := 0;
while (i < 20)f
if (a[i] == N) fgoto Done; g
i := i+ 1;
g
Done :
A break statement transfers control of program to the statement following the
enclosing statement. Any break statement with no label, transfers the control of
program to the nearest enclosing while loop. Any break statement with specied
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label, transfers the control of program to the immediate statement that follows the
label. The following example shows a break statement.
i := 0;
while (i < 20)f
if (a[i] == N) fbreak; g
i := i+ 1;
g
 If Statement
The if statement is similar to the usual conditional statement. There are two
kinds of if statement in Boogie. The rst kind uses a Boolean expression to choose
one of its alternatives.
if (E) Thn else Els;
The second kind uses a * as the WildCardExpr and chooses arbitrarily between
the alternatives.
if () Thn else Els;
 While Statement
The while loop is the usual iteration that loop body executes while the guard is
true. The syntax is as follows:
while (E) invs S;
Also, Boogie supports another form of while loop which iterates for an arbitrary
number of times.
while () invs S;
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Both while loops have an invariant declaration. The loop invariant must hold at
the start of each iteration. The loop invariant is checked immediately before the loop
and at the end of the loop body.
 Call Statements
A call statement represents the caller traces dened by the procedure declaration.
The following example calls procedure P .
call ys := P (xs);
The xs are the input parameters and ys are the output parameters. The ys list
must be distinct and mutable variables. The number of parameters is the left-hand-
side must be equal to the number of formal out-parameters of the procedure. The
procedure declaration can have generic types, in this case, the type arguments will
be instantiated in call statement too.
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Chapter 3
Verication Methodology
HARPO/L is a multi-threaded object-oriented programming language. It makes use
of mutable objects, aliasing and modularity. It also supports multithreading, which
imposes the need to consider data races. We are interested in verifying HARPO/L
programs with such characteristics. This requires developing a system of specications
and a methodology of reasoning.
Specications are sets of annotations describing the behavior of a program. More
specically, they explicitly declare the requirements of implementation. Writing spec-
ications can be done in many ways but we are interested in developing a systematic
way to write specications and to reason about specications and programs. Our
verication methodology is based on implicit dynamic frames [7] with fractional per-
missions [8]. This model allows modularity, ne-grained locking, concurrent data
structures, rendezvous and concurrent readers. More importantly, it allows ruling
out data races. In this section, the specication language and verication methodol-
ogy will be described.
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3.0 Pre- and Postconditions
Each method is specied by pre- and postconditions. The precondition declares the
constraints on the state which must be valid before execution of the method. A
postcondition declares conditions which are guaranteed to be correct after method
execution. The precondition must be established by the caller and the postcondi-
tion must be established by the method. Both preconditions and postconditions are
Boolean and side-e¤ect-free expressions. A method can have more than one precondi-
tion or postcondition. The nal precondition is the conjunction of the preconditions
and the nal postcondition is the conjunction of the postconditions. The declaration
of precondition and postcondition contracts is as follows:
MethodDecl  ! Access proc Name (Parameters) (ConditionSpec j PermissionSpec)
ConditionSpec  ! pre precondition
j post postcondition
To illustrate how method contracts work, the example in listing 3.0 is provided.
Class Math has a method called divide which calculates the division of two input
numbers a and b and returns the result c. The method is annotated with two speci-
cations. The precondition, starting with the keyword pre indicates that the method
divide expects the caller to provide a non-zero value for b. The postconditon, starting
with the keyword post declares the output parameter c will equal to division of input
parameters.
The postcondition is a two-state predicate meaning it relates the value of variable
at entry to method to the nal value of the variable at the exist. The nal value is
marked with an apostrophe to distinguish it from the initial value.
(class Math
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public proc divide(in a, b : real32, out c : real32)
pre b != 0
post c= a / b
(thread (t0)
(while true
(accept divide(in a, b : real32, out c : real32)
c := a / b
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.0: A program that illustrates pre- and postcondition
3.1 Ghost States
Ghost variables are added to aid reasoning about the code. They are marked by the
ghost keyword which distinguishes them from program variables. They have no e¤ect
on program execution and we can remove them without a¤ecting the program behav-
ior. Ghost variables may be used in specications and ghost code. More specically,
they may be used as elds, local variables, constructor parameters or method para-
meters. Ghost variables can be updated by ghost code. The ghost variables allows
writing specications for modular verication. The declaration of ghost variables is
shown below:
ObjectDecl  ! [ghost] (const j obj) Name [ : Type] := InitExp
CParam  ! [ghost] obj Name : Type j [ghost] in Name : Type
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3.2 Permissions
Threads can access memory locations concurrently. In order to avoid data races and
have multiple concurrent readers, data accesses must be restricted, meaning, threads
may access memory locations only if they are allowed. This model is implemented by
fractional permissions [8]. In this methodology, a thread may read or write a memory
location only if it has read or write permission for that location. A permission is a
quantity between 0 and 1. To write a memory location, a thread requires having full
permission which is one. To read a memory location, a thread needs a permission
greater than zero. The sum of permissions for each location in whole system is less
than or equal to one. This eliminates data races but allows multiple readers.
For verication purpose, we add a new primitive type Perm which represents
real values between zero and one. Zero represents no permission, one represent full
permission and any value between zero, and one means read permission. This type is
added for verication purposes, and it can only be used for ghost variables.
Pemission specications declare the amount of permission on locations. The syn-
tax of permission maps in specications is shown below:
PermMap  ! LocSet j LocSet@Expression j PermMap; PermMap
LocSet  ! ObjectId j fName : Set [Guard] do LocSetg
Set  ! fExpression; ::Expressiong j fExpression; ::; Expressiong j Expression
ObjectId  ! Name j ObjectId[Expression] j ObjectId:Name
To express the amount of permission on locations the symbole @ is used. For
instance, o.f@0.5 declares the amount of permission on location o:f is o:5. If the
amount of permission is full permission, it is allowed to remove the amount part. A
location set may be a single object id or a set of locations. The latter form is useful for
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expressing permission on array locations. For instance, fi : f0; ::; 10g do E:f [i]g@0:5
declares 0.5 permission on array elements numbered 0 to 10, inclusive. As shown in
the productions, set has three forms. In the rst form, the higher bound is exclusive.
In the second form, the higher bound is inclusive. The third form is equivalent to
f0; ::Expressiong.
3.3 Threads
A thread can access a memory location if it has permission. Initially, threads can
get access to a memory location by claim specication. This gives the specied
permission to the thread which can be read or write permission. We can assume that
these permissions are transferred from the system to the threads at the beginning of
execution. The sum of claims for each location over all permission holders must be
less than or equal to one. The declaraion of thread specication is shown below:
ThreadDecl  ! (thread [Claim] Block [thread])
Claim  ! claim PermMap
For instance, thread t0 in listing 3.1 claims full permission on a, b and c. This
allows the thread to access those elds.
The permission held by threads can change over time. There are two ways that
threads can gain or lose permission. The rst way is by methods annotated with per-
mission transfer specications. The second way is by locks annotated with permission
transfer specications.
(class Math
public proc Add()
takes a@0.5, b@0.5, c@1.0
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post c= a + b
gives a@0.5, b@0.5, c@1.0
obj a : int32 := 0
obj b : int32 := 0
obj c : int32 := 0
(thread (t0) claim a@1.0, b@1.0, c@1.0
//t0 requires access to a,b, c
//and also transfers read permissions to t1
//t0 receives the required permissions by claim specication
b := 0
c := 1
Add()
thread)
(thread (t1)
(while true
(accept Add()
c := a + b
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.1: A program that illustrates permissions
3.4 Methods
A method can be annotated by permission specications. The permission required by
a method is declared by a takes annotation and the returned permission is declared
by a gives annotation. Upon a call to a method that has a takes annotation, the
caller loses the specied permission and the thread being called receives it. After the
call, the callee loses the specied permission and the caller will receive it. To have
a simpler specication, we can use borrows keyword instead of takes and gives
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annotations with same permission map. The declaration of permission specications
in a method is as follows:
PermissionSpec  ! takes PermMap
j gives PermMap
j borrows PermMap
For instance, the method Add in lising 3.1 requires read permission on a and b
which is specied by takes. Furthermore, it requires write permission on eld c.
The caller is responsible to provide permissions on these locations and they will be
transferred from the caller to the callee. After execution, the method returns all
the permission it received initially. This is specied by a gives annotation, which
transfers the permissions from the callee to the caller.
In Add method, the chosen amount of read permission is 0.5 but it makes no
di¤erence what positive amount between zero and one is chosen. The fact is that
choosing concrete read permissions for methods is a tedious task and it is preferred
to do this in a more abstract way.
3.5 Abstract Read Permissions
Fractional permissions allow arbitrary many read permissions. A thread with a frac-
tion of permission can split it many times, giving other threads read permission.
However specifying the precise amount of permission for each method is a tedious
task for the user. The fact is that the user usually needs only to distinguish be-
tween write or read permission and knowing the concrete value of the permission
is mostly irrelevant. Moreover, the specication written with concrete permissions is
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less reusable and it is more desirable to think about read permissions in more abstract
way [24].
The main problem with concrete permission fractions is the reusability of speci-
cations. Specifying a method with a concrete amount only allows the callers with
equal or more permission to call the method. Method Add in listing 3.1 requires ex-
actly 0.5 permission which only allows the callers with 0.5 or more permission to call
the method. The fact is that a caller with read permission must be allowed to call
any method with read permissions. This makes writing specication complicated be-
cause the permission of other threads must be considered too. Moreover, this makes
the specications dependent to implementation. It means that the changes in imple-
mentation of other threads may lead to rewriting the permission specication of the
method.
(class Math
public proc Add(ghost in ga, gb: Perm)
takes a@ga, b@gb, c@1.0
pre 0 < ga < 1 /\ 0 < gb < 1
post c= a + b
gives a@ga, b@gb, c@1.0
obj a : int32 := 0
obj b : int32 := 0
obj c : int32 := 0
(thread (t0) claim a@1.0, b@1.0, c@1.0
b := 0
c := 1
Add(0.5, 0.5)
thread)
(thread (t1)
(while true
(accept Add(in ga, gb : Perm)
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c := a + b
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.2: A program that illustrates abstract permission
To overcome the issues with concrete factional permissions, a more abstract way
is implemented by ghost parameters. In this model, the caller decides the amount
of given read permission and sends it via ghost parameters. This makes the callee
independent of any specic amount of permission. This approach solves the problem
of reusability and provides a more exible reasoning method. To illustrate this, the
example of listing 3.1 is rewritten using this approach. The thread t1 requires read
permission on elds a and b. As shown in listing 3.2, the caller decides to give half
of its permission on elds a and b. The method Add can be veried despite the exact
amount of permission not being known.
3.6 Permission Transfer Scenarios
A thread can have a number of accept commands. In the previous examples, all
the code is implemented by one method which takes permissions in the entry of the
method and returns all of them in the existing. However, to have a higher level of
concurrency, it is better to use two di¤erent methods to start an operation and nish
it. This allows the client to execute concurrently with the started server thread.
This structure complicates reasoning about the code. First, the client which started
the operation may not be the one which nishes it. Second, the thread may not
necessarily return the same permission it received. For example, it may call others
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methods leading to gain or loss of some permission.
It is important to be sure that our model can handle these complications. In this
section, we look at three representative patterns of communication and permission
transfer between threads. Generally, a thread may start another thread and gives it
some permission. For nishing the started thread, two cases are possible: the thread
which started it will nish it (scenario 1) or another thread will nish it (scenario 2, 3).
Verifying these example patterns ensures us that our chosen methodology can verify
those and similar examples. In the next section, the three representative patterns will
be discussed. In all of scenarios, there is a main client thread and two server threads.
The server threads use two methods for synchronization, one for taking permission
and the second one for giving permission. The rst scenario simulate a method call
in sequential programming except the start and the end of code is accessed by two
calls. This feature increases parallelism. The second and third scenarios are useful for
message passing where a thread sends a messages to other thread and nally receives
back the message via another thread.
3.6.0 Scenario 1
In this scenario, the client thread sends a start message to one of server threads and
gives it access permission. The started server thread starts the other server thread
and gives its required access permission. Finally, both threads will be nished by the
threads which have started them and they will return exactly the permissions they
received initially.
To illustrate this scenario, an example in listing 3.3 is provided. There is one
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client thread, t0_client and two worker threads, t1_server1 and t2_server2. Thread
t0_client initially has full permission on eld a. It starts another thread t1_server1
by calling worker1_start which requires read permission on eld a. The caller is
responsible to provide the required permission and gives half of its own permission
to t1_server1. In order to have abstract permissions, the given permission is sent by
ghost parameter p1, and it is asserted in precondition that it is a non-zero and partial
permission. However, thread t1_server1 also needs this value out of the scope of
worker1_start method because, for each memory access, it must be asserted that the
thread has enough permission. Therefore, the initial amount of received permission
is stored in a ghost eld, gp1, and it is asserted in the postcondition that it is equal
to the input permission parameter. The ghost eld gp1 is added for reasoning and it
must be guaranteed that it will not be modied until the worker1_nish block. For
this reason, the thread makes gp1 read-only after storing the received permission.
This is implemented by splitting the permission of eld a by thread t1_server1 and
transferring half of permission on the gp1 to the caller thread.
The started thread (t1_server1) also starts another thread which requires read
permission too. Thread t1_server1 provides it by giving half of its read permission.
Thread t2_server2 keeps all received permission and has no permission transfer while
executing. Finally, thread t1_server1 which started the thread t2_server2 nishes it
by calling worker2_nish. This makes transferring of permission to the caller which
makes thread t1_server1 to retain its lost permission and have permission equal to
gp1 again.
Finally, thread t0_client, which started t1_server1, will nish it by calling worker1_nish.
The caller must return its permission on the ghost eld gp1 which is asserted in the
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precondition. Also, the callee returns its received permission in the postcondition of
the method. However, the permission is stored in gp1 which cannot be mentioned
in the postcondition anymore because the caller gave back its permission on gp1 in
the precondition. For this reason, a copy of gp1 is sent by the ghost input parameter
p1_init and it is asserted that p1_init is equal to gp1 in the precondition. Based on
the fact that input parameters are not changeable, we can use p1_init in the postcon-
dition to specify the returning permission. The caller can assume that all the given
permission is returned.
(class C
constructor()
public proc main()
//receives read permission on the eld a and stores the amount in gp1
public proc worker1_start(in ghost p1 : Perm)
takes a@p1
pre 0 < p1 /\ p1 < 1.0
post gp1== p1
gives gp1@0.5
//returns read permission equal to recieved permission via worker1_start
public proc worker1_nish(in ghost p1_init : Perm)
takes gp1@0.5
pre p1_init == gp1
gives a@p1_init
//receives read permission on the eld a and stores the amount in gp2
public proc worker2_start(in ghost p2 : Perm)
takes a@p2
pre 0 < p2 /\ p2 < 1.0
post gp2== p2
gives gp2@0.5
//returns read permission equal to recieved permission via worker2_start
public proc worker2_nish(in ghost p2_init : Perm)
47
takes gp2@0.5
pre p2_init == gp2
gives a@p2_init
public obj a : bool := 0
public ghost obj gp1, gp2 : Perm := 0
//t0 has full permission on the eld a
//gives read permission to t1 and nally receives back it from t1
(thread (t0_client) claim a@1.0
(while true
invariant acc a@1.0
(accept main()
obj ghost pc1 : Perm := 0.5
worker1_start(pc1)
worker1_nish(pc1)
accept)
while)
thread)
(thread (t1_server1) claim gp1@1.0
(while true
invariant acc gp1@1.0
(accept worker1_start(in ghost p1 : Perm)
gp1 := p1
accept)
obj ghost pc2 : Perm := gp1 / 2
worker2_start(pc2)
worker2_nish(pc2)
(accept worker1_nish(in ghost p1_init : Perm)
accept)
while)
thread)
(thread (t2_server2) claim gp2@1.0
(while true
invariant acc gp2@1.0
(accept worker2_start(in ghost p2 : Perm)
gp2 := p2
accept)
(accept worker2_nish(in ghost p2_init : Perm)
accept)
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while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.3: A program that shows scenario 1 of permission transfer
3.6.1 Scenario 2
In this scenario, the client thread sends a start message to a server thread and gives
it read permission. The started server thread sends a start message to another server
thread and transfers it read permission too. Finally, the client thread nishes both
of the server threads.
To illustrate this scenario, the example in listing 3.4 is provided. The thread
t0_client starts server thread t1_server1 and gives it read permission on eld a.
Thread t1_server1 starts thread t2_server2 and gives it read permission on a too.
This makes thread t1_server1 lose permission. However, it will not nish the child
thread that it has started. As a result, it will nish with less permission that it
was started with. Finally, the client thread t0_client will call the nish methods
of both of t1_server1 and t2_server2. The reasoning about this scenario is similar
to scenario 1 but two important issues must be declared in the specication. First,
thread t1_server1 must acknowledge its caller about the given permission to thread
t2_server2 enabling the caller to nish a thread which it has not started. Second,
thread t1_server1 does not return the same permission it received and it must declare
its new permission to its caller at the time of nishing.
As shown in the code, rst, the server thread t1_server1 informs the client about its
given permission to thread t2_server2. Thread t1_server1 stores the given permission
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to thread t2_server2 in the ghost eld gp2 and passes all of its permission on gp2 to the
client because it does not need to access gp2 anymore and the client is responsible for
nishing t2_server2. Also, to inform the client about the value of gp2, a specication
is added in the postcondition of worker1_start stating the relation between the initial
received permission (gp1) and the given permission (gp2). These two specications
enable the client thread to reason about a server thread that it has not started.
Second, thread t1_server1 must return its nal permission which is less than what
it received initially. It sends its nal permission via the output parameter po1 and it
is asserted that po1 is half of the initial received permission. Finally, thread t0_client
nishes thread t1_server1 and receives half of the initial transferred permission. It
also nishes thread t2_server2 and gains its returning permission. It can reason about
thread t2_server2 because it was informed about it before. At this point, the main
client will have received all given permission back and has full access on eld a.
(class C
constructor()
public proc main()
//receives read permission on the eld a and stores the amount in gp1
//gives read permission to t2
public proc worker1_start(in ghost p1 : Perm)
takes a@p1
pre 0 < p1 and p1 < 1.0
post gp1== p1
post gp2== p1 / 2
gives gp1@0.5, gp2@0.5
//returns read permission to the caller
//the retuned permission is the half of the permission
//that it received via worker1_start
public proc worker1_nish(in ghost p1_init : Perm,
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out po1 : Perm)
takes gp1@0.5
pre p1_init == gp1
post po1== p1_init / 2
gives a@po1
//receives read permission on the eld a and stores the amount in gp2
public proc worker2_start(in ghost p2 : Perm)
takes a@p2
pre 0 < p2 and p2 < 1.0
post gp2== p2
gives gp2@0.5
//returns read permission to the caller
//the retuned permission is equal to the permission it received via worker2_start
public proc worker2_nish(in ghost p2_init : Perm,
out ghost po2 : Perm)
takes gp2@0.5
pre p2_init == gp2
post p02== p2_init
gives a@po2
public obj a : bool := 0
public ghost obj gp1, gp2 : Perm := 0
(thread (t0_client) claim a@1.0
(while true
(accept main()
obj ghost p : Perm := 0
obj ghost pc1, pr1, pr2 : Perm := 0
p := 1
pc1 := p / 2
p := p   pc1
worker1_start(pc1)
worker1_nish(pc1, pr1)
p := p + pr1
worker2_nish(gp2, pr2)
p := p + pr2
assert p == 1
accept)
while)
thread)
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(thread (t1_server1) claim gp1@1.0
(while true
obj ghost pc2 : Perm
(accept worker1_start(in ghost p1 : Perm)
gp1 := p1
pc2 := gp1/2
worker2_start(pc2)
accept)
(accept worker1_nish(in ghost p1_init : Perm,
out ghost po1 : Perm)
po1 := gp1/2
accept)
while)
thread)
(thread (t2_server2) claim gp2@1
(while true
(accept worker2_start(in ghost p2 : Perm)
gp2 := p2
accept)
(accept worker2_nish(in ghost p2_init : Perm,
out ghost po2 : Perm)
po2 := p2_init
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.4: A program that shows scenario 2 of permission transfer
3.6.2 Scenario 3
In this scenario, the client thread starts both server threads and gives them read
permission on eld a. The rst child thread must nish the other child thread even
though it did not start the other child. Finally, the client will nish the remaining
server thread.
An example of this scenario is provided in the listing 3.5. In this case, both
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worker threads are started by thread t0_client. The server thread t2_server2 nishes
thread t1_server1 and receives its permission. The client calls worker2_nish and will
receive all the permission back. First, the child thread should be informed of the
permission of the other thread to be able to reason about it. Second, it gains some
permission by nishing the other thread and it must inform the main client about its
new permission.
To handle this situation, server thread t2_server2 requires read permission on
gp1 which will be given to it by the client t0_client. This helps it to reason about
thread t1_server1. The returning permission of thread t2_server2 is the sum of its
initial permission and thread t1_server1s initial permission. This is specied in its
postcondition and it informs the main client by an output parameter.
(class C
constructor()
public proc main()
//receives read permission on the eld a and stores the amount in gp1
public proc worker1_start(in ghost p1 : Perm)
takes a@p1
pre 0 < p1 and p1 < 1.0
post gp1== p1
gives gp1@0.5
//returns read permission equal to recieved permission via worker1_start
public proc worker1_nish(in ghost p1_init : Perm)
takes gp1@0.5
pre p1_init == gp1
gives a@p1_init
//receives read permission on the eld a and stores the amount in gp2
public proc worker2_start(in ghost p2 : Perm)
takes a@p2
pre 0 < p2 and p2 < 1.0
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post gp2== p2
gives gp2@0.5
//receives read permission on gp1 and gp2
//which have the recieved permissions of t1 and t2
//returns the sum of its received read permission and the read permission of t1
public proc worker2_nish(in ghost p1_init, p2_init : Perm,
out ghost po : Perm)
takes gp1@0.5, gp2@0.5
pre p2_init == gp2
pre p1_init == gp1
post po== p1_init + p2_init
gives a@po
public obj a : bool := 0
public ghost obj gp1, gp2 : Perm := 0.0
(thread (t0_client) claims a@1.0
(while true
invariant acc a@1.0
(accept main()
obj ghost p : Perm := 1.0
obj ghost pc1, pc2, po : Perm := 0.0
pc1 := p / 2
p := p   pc1
pc2 := p / 2
p := p   pc2
worker1_start(pc1)
worker2_start(pc2)
worker2_nish(pc1, pc2, po)
p := p + po
accept)
while)
thread)
(thread (t1_server1) claim gp1@1.0
(while true
invariant acc gp1@1.0
(accept worker1_start(in ghost p1 : Perm)
gp1 := p1
accept)
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(accept worker1_nish(in ghost p1_init : Perm)
accept)
while)
thread)
(thread (t2_server2) claim gp2@1.0
(while true
invariant acc gp2@1.0
(accept worker2_start(in ghost p2 : Perm)
gp2 := p2
accept)
(accept worker2_nish(in ghost p1_init, p2_init : Perm,
out ghost po : Perm)
worker1_nish(p1_init)
po := p1_init + p2_init
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.5: A program that shows scenario 3 of permission transfer
3.7 Locks and Class Invariants
The second way to synchronize accessing shared memory locations is locks. In the
previous sections, threads were holders of access permissions and they transfer per-
missions between each other via the rendezvous mechanism. However, sometimes
multiple threads must access a shared data concurrently and they must obtain and
relinquish access while they are executing. To avoid data races, such accesses are
protected by locks. In fact, lock objects become the holders of permissions. A thread
must acquire the lock object to access shared data exclusively. The code can explic-
itly be annotated by takes and gives. A takes means the permission will explicitly
transfer from the object to the thread after acquiring the lock. A gives will transfer
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permission from the thread to the object after releasing the lock. However, often
there is no need for permission transfer between the object and the thread. To check
that a thread has su¢ cient permission for each data access inside the lock, it will be
checked that the sum of the permissions of the thread and the lock allows the data
access. Furthermore, a lock may have a guard section which requires permission to
be checked. The syntax of with satements is as follows:
Command! (with Exp [takes PermMap] [Guard] [do]
Block [gives PermMap] [with])
In this synchronization model, each class may be annotated by a claim speci-
cation which gives the specied permission to the object at initialization time. Also,
each is associated with an invariant. The invariant species the permission which is
held by the object. It may also have some conditions on the variables. The invariant
must be valid after initialization and after each release of the mutual exclusion lock.
The syntax of class is as follows:
ClassDecl  ! (class [ClassSpec] ClassMembers class)
ClassSpec  ! Claim j Invariant
Invariant  ! invariant Conditions
For instance, class Counter in listing 3.6 has the shared eld count. It is claimed
with half permission by the object of the class and so the invariant is valid after
initialization.
(class Counter
claim count@0.5
invariant acc count@0.5 /\ count >= 0
constructor()
proc increment()
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takes count@0.5
pre count >= 0
post count> 0
gives count@0.5
obj count : real32 := 0
(thread (t0)
(while true
(accept increment()
(with this
count := count + 1
with)
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.6: A program that shows class invariant and a lock block
Method incrementmodies eld count and needs full access. In the precondition, it
takes half permission. After successful acquisition of the lock, it is allowed to modify
eld count. In fact, for each data access inside the lock, it is checked whether the sum
of the permission of the thread and the lock allows the access. The thread releases
the lock after modication. The invariant must hold at the time the lock is released,
which it does for this example.
3.8 Parallelism
The co (concurrent) statement declares that two or more blocks of code execute in
parallel. Each part of a co command executes independently and they may access
shared data concurrently. To avoid data races, it must be checked that the co threads
have write access to disjoint locations. For this reason, each co thread explicitly
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species its required permission on locations by a claim specication. Their required
permissions will be transferred from the parent to the children. As a result, the sum
of permissions required by co threads cannot exceed the permission of the parent
thread. This rules out the possibility of data races. At the end, the co threads will
return their permissions to the parent thread. The syntax of co statement is declared
as follows:
Command  ! (co [Claim] Block ( jj [Claim] Block)+ [co])
The following example in listing 3.7, thread t0 has co statements. Both co blocks
require read access on location a and write accesses on disjoint locations. The parent
thread will transfer the required permission to co threads. We can see that it will
be an error if both threads request for write permission on same location because
the permission cannot be duplicated. Finally, the co threads return all the initial
received permission to the parent thread.
(class C
constructor()
public proc Add()
takes a
pre a >= 0
pre Isint32(a+2)
post a= a + 2
gives a
obj a : int32 := 0
(thread (to)
(while true
(accept Add()
obj sum1, sum2 : int32 := 0
(co
claims a@0.5, sum1@1.0
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sum1 := a + 1
||
claims a@0.25, sum2@1.0
sum2 := a + 1
co)
a := sum1 + sum2
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.7: A program that illustrates co statement specications
3.9 Loop Invariant
A loop may contain innite iterations which makes it impossible to verify all of them
individually. For this reason, loops are specied by loop invariants. The invariant
must hold at the entry to the loop. Also, it must be valid at the end of each iteration
of the loop. The chosen loop invariant must be strong enough to prove the post-
condition of the method too. The invariant consists of access permissions annotated
with keyword acc and condition specications. The declarations of loop invariant for
while and for satements are shown below:
Command  ! (while Expression [Invariant] [do] Block [while])
j (for Name : Bounds [Invariant] [do] Block [for])
The example in listing 3.8 illustrates a loop invariant for while statement. The
method calculates the square root of eld n by while loop.
(class Math
constructor()
public proc Sqrt()
takes n@1.0
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pre 0 <= n
post n n<= n && n< (n+1)  (n+1)
gives n@1.0
obj n : int32 := 100
(thread (t0)
(while true
(accept Sqrt()
obj m : int32 := n
n := 0
(while ((n+1)(n+1) <= m)
invariant acc n@1.0 && nn <= m
n := n + 1
while)
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.8: A program that shows while statement with loop invariant
The example in listing 3.9 is provided to show a for loop with an invariant. The
Add method adds input parameter n to the eld sum by for loop.
(class Math
constructor()
procedure Add(in n : int32)
takes sum@1.0
pre n >= 0 && sum >= 0
pre Isint32(sum+n)
post sum== sum + n
gives sum@1.0
obj sum : int32 := 0
(thread (t0)
(while true
(accept add(in n : int32)
(for i : n
invariant acc i@1.0 && (0 <= i && i < n)
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invariant acc sum@1.0 && sum == i
sum := sum + 1
for)
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.9: A program that shows for statement with loop invariant
3.10 Array
HARPO/L supports array objects. In reasoning about arrays, we only consider per-
mission on the level of items of arrays with primitive types. This allows multiple
threads to work concurrently on separate elements of an array. For instance, in the
following example, the method takes write permission only on even elements of array
and returns the permission in those locations at the end.
(class Math
proc Even_Op()
takes {i : {0,..n} when even(i) do a(i)}@1.0
gives {i : {0,..n} when even(i) do a(i)}@1.0
const n := 10
obj a : int32[n] := (for i : n do 0 for)
(thread (t0)
(while true
(accept Even_Op()
//implementation code
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 3.10: A program that illustrates arrays
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Chapter 4
Translating HARPO/L to Boogie
This chapter presents translation of the HARPO programming language and the spec-
ication constructs to Boogie based on our methodology. The translation into Boogie
consists of two steps. First, a prelude is declared which encodes some properties of
all HARPO/L programs. Then, the specic program is translated into Boogie.
Note that ghost variables are behaved as regular variables in Boogie. For this
reason, ghost keyword is ignored in the translation.
4.0 Prelude
The translation from HARPO/L to Boogie starts with a prelude. The prelude is
independent of the program being translated. In fact, it encodes some properties that
are required for translation of all HARPO/L programs. The nal Boogie program
consists of the prelude and the translation of the specic program.
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4.0.0 Modeling Memory
One of the rst and important decisions when designing a translation from a source
language into Boogie is the modeling of the memory. HARPO/L is an object oriented
language with object references and elds. The memory can be represented in several
models. We chose to dene the heap (memory) as a variable which maps object
references and elds to values.
type Ref ;
type Field ;
type HeapType = hi[Ref ;Field ];
var Heap : HeapType;
The translation into Boogie introduces a type constructor Ref to model object
references. All the reference types in HARPO/L are mapped to Boogie type Ref.
The memory is represented by global variable Heap. Its type is a polymorphic map
because the elds can have di¤erent values depending on the eld name used. Each
eld declared in HARPO/L gives rise to a unique value of type Field , where  is
the type of the eld.
Furthermore, to model arrays another heap is required. To store the elements of
arrays, a global variable, ArrayHeap, is dened. ArrayHeap maps array references
and indices to the value of elements.
type ArrayRef ;
type ArrayHeapType = hi[ArrayRef ; int ];
var ArrayHeap : ArrayHeapType;
4.0.1 Reference Types
To model class and interface types, the prelude declares a Boogie type:
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type ClassName;
Every class declaration gives rise to a particular value of ClassName type. Because
all HARPO/L objects are modelled by values of type Ref, a function dtype is added
to the translation. Function dtype returns the run-time type of a reference.
function dtype(Ref) returns (ClassName);
4.0.2 Type Axioms
HARPO/L supports several bounded integer types with di¤erent sizes. All of HAR-
PO/L integer types are translated to int type in Boogie. To check that integer types
are in their associated bound, we declare a function and axiom for each integer type:
const unique min8 : int;
axiom min8 ==  128;
const unique max8 : int;
axiom max8 == 127;
const unique min16 : int;
axiom min16 ==  32768;
const unique max16 : int;
axiom max16 == 32767;
const unique min32 : int;
axiom min32 ==  2147483648;
const unique max32 : int;
axiom max32 == 2147483647;
const unique min64 : int;
axiom min64 ==  9223372036854775808;
const unique max64 : int;
axiom max64 == 9223372036854775807;
function Isint8 (int) returns (bool);
axiom (forall x : int :: Isint8(x) <==> min8 <= x && x <= max8);
function Isint16(int) returns(bool);
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axiom (forall x : int :: Isint16(x) <==> min16 <= x && x <= max16);
function Isint32 (int) returns (bool);
axiom (forall x : int :: Isint32(x) <==> min32 <= x && x <= max32);
function Isint64 (int) returns (bool);
axiom (forall x : int :: Isint64(x) <==> min64 <= x && x <= max64);
Furthermore, the following function is added to check the range of integers. (The
function Tr translates a HARPO/L program to a Boogie program.)
Isint(E :f )H1 ;H2 ;P 
((Type(E :f ) == int8) ==> Isint8 (H1 [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;C :f ]) jj
(Type(E :f ) == int16) ==> Isint16 (H1 [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;C :f ]) jj
(Type(E :f ) == int32) ==> Isint32 (H1 [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;C :f ]) jj
(Type(E :f ) == int64) ==> Isint64 (H1 [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;C :f ]));
Isint(E [i ])H1 ;H2 ;P 
((Type(E ) == int8) ==> Isint8 (ArrayH1 [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;Tr [i ]H1 ;H2 ;P ]) jj
(Type(E ) == int16) ==> Isint16 (ArrayH1 [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;Tr [i ]H1 ;H2 ;P ]) jj
(Type(E ) == int32) ==> Isint32 (ArrayH1 [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;Tr [i ]H1 ;H2 ;P ]) jj
(Type(E ) == int64) ==> Isint64 (ArrayH1 [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;Tr [i ]H1 ;H2 ;P ]));
4.0.3 Array Length
The length of an array is modeled with the Length function. For each array declara-
tion, we can add an axiom regarding its length.
function Length hx i(Field (ArrayRef x )) returns (int);
4.0.4 Permission
A permission is a real number between zero and one. The translation introduces type
Perm to model permissions.The type Perm is a type synonym of real type. Boogie
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handles oating-point approximation and it is guaranteed that no permission loss
will happen. Furthermore, the permissions of all elds are encoded as a map from
locations to the permissions on those locations. A new type PermissionType will be
declared in the prelude:
type Perm = real;
type PermissionType : hi[Ref ; Field ]Perm;
To keep track of permission, each thread has its own local variable Permission
of type PermissionType. A permission p is called full permission if p is equal to
1.0. It is called some permissionif p is greater than zero. Furthermore, it is called
no permissionif p is equal to zero. We introduce three shorthands for the common
permission requirements. CanRead checks having some permission, CanWrite checks
having full permission and CanAccess checks having the specied permission:
CanRead(E :f )H1 ;H2 ;P  P [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;C :f ] > 0:0
CanWrite(E :f )H1 ;H2 ;P  P [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;C :f ] == 1:0
CanAccess(E :f@n)H1 ;H2 ;P  P [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;C :f ] == n
CanAccess(E :f )H1 ;H2 ;P  P [Tr [E ]H1 ;H2 ;P ;C :f ] == 1:0
Pemissions can be incremented or decremented. Two operations are introduced
to model permission changes. AddPermission adds the declared permission to the
current permission. RemovePermission checks that the current thread holds enough
permission and then decreases it. These operations are declared as follows:
AddPermission(E:f@n)H1;H2;P 
P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ] = P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ] + n
AddPermission(E:f)H1;H2;P 
P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ] = P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ] + 1:0
RemovePermission(E:f@n)H1;H2;P 
assert P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ] >= n
P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ] = P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ]  n
RemovePermission(E:f)H1;H2;P 
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assert P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ] == 1:0
P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ] = P [Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ]  1:0
Additionally, to track permission on array elements, permission type ArrayPer-
missionType is declared:
type ArrayPermissionType : hi[ArrayRef ; int]Perm;
Each thread declares a new local variable, ArrayPermission to store its permission
on elements of arrays. Permission shorthands for arrays are declared as follows:
CanRead(E:f [i])H1;H2;P  P [H1[Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ]; T r[i]H1;H2;P ] > 0:0
CanWrite(E:f [i])H1;H2;P  P [H1[Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ]; T r[i]H1;H2;P ] == 1:0
CanAccess(E:f [i]@n)H1;H2;P  P [H1[Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ]; T r[i]H1;H2;P ] == n
CanAccess(E:f [i])H1;H2;P  P [H1[Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ]; T r[i]H1;H2;P ] == 1:0
In the following part, permission operations for arrays are declared:
AddPermission(E:f [i]@n)
H1;H2;P

P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
] = P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
] + n;
AddPermission(E:f [i])
H1;H2;P

P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
] = P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
]+1:0;
AddPermission(fi : Set when Cond do Eg@n)
H1;H2;P

assert Df [E]
H1;H2;P
=n Df [Set]
H1;H2;P
=n Df [Cond]
H1;H2;P
;
foreach i in Tr[Set]
H1;H2;P
;
if Tr[Cond]
H1;H2;P
fAddPermission(E@n)
H1;H2;P
; g
AddPermission(fi : Set when Cond do Eg)
H1;H2;P

assert Df [E]
H1;H2;P
=n Df [Set]
H1;H2;P
=n Df [Cond]
H1;H2;P
;
foreach i in Tr[Set]
H1;H2;P
if Tr[Cond]
H1;H2;P
fAddPermission(E@1:0)
H1;H2;P
; g
RemovePermission(E:f [i]@n)
H1;H2;P

assert P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
] >= n;
P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
] = P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
]  n;
RemovePermission(E:f)
H1;H2;P

assert P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
] == 1:0;
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P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
] = P [H1[Tr[E]
H1;H2;P
; C:f ]; T r[i]
H1;H2;P
] 1:0;
RemovePermission(fi : Set when Cond do Eg@n)
H1;H2;P

assert Df [E]
H1;H2;P
=n Df [Set]
H1;H2;P
=n Df [Cond]
H1;H2;P
;
foreach i in Tr[Set]
H1;H2;P
if Tr[Cond]
H1;H2;P
fRemovePermission(E@n)
H1;H2;P
; g
RemovePermission(fi : Set when Cond do Eg)
H1;H2;P
=
assert Df [E]
H1;H2;P
=n Df [Set]
H1;H2;P
=n Df [Cond]
H1;H2;P
;
foreach i in Tr[Set]
H1;H2;P
if Tr[Cond]
H1;H2;P
fRemovePermission(E@1:0)
H1;H2;P
; g
Generally, when adding permission to a thread via claims or any synchronization
method, if the thread has zero permission on a location, we havoc that location to
an arbitrary value. The reason is that other threads may have changed the value of
that location. The operation HavocNewLoc is added for this purpose; it will be used
when adding permission. First, it checks whether the permission on the location is
zero. Then, it havocs that location in the heap.
HavocNewLoc(E :f )H1;H2;P 
if (P [Tr [E ]H1;H2;P ;C :f ] == 0:0)
fhavoc H_tmp;
H1 [Tr [E ]H1;H2;P ;C :f ] := H_tmp[Tr [E ]H1;H2;P ;C :f ]; g
HavocNewLoc(E :f [i ])H1;H2;P 
if (ArrayP [H1 [Tr [E ]H1;H2;P ;C :f ];Tr [i ]H1 ;H2 ;P ] == 0:0)
fhavoc ArrayH_tmp;
ArrayH1 [H1 [Tr [E ]H1;H2;P ;C :f ];Tr [i ]H1 ;H2 ;P ] :=
ArrayH_tmp[H1 [Tr [E ]H1;H2;P ;C :f ];Tr [i ]H1 ;H2 ;P ]; g
HavocNewLoc(fi : Set when Cond do Eg)H1;H2;P 
foreach i in Tr [Set ]H1;H2;P ;
if Tr [Cond ]H1;H2;P fHavocNewLoc(E )H1;H2;P ; g
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4.1 Translation
A HARPO/L program consists of a set of class, interface and object declarations:
Program  ! (ClassDecl j IntfDecl j ObjectDecl j ConstDecl j ;)
To translate programs, we dene the function Tr. It takes a HARPO/L program
as input and generates a Boogie program. In the following section, the translation of
a program will be described. C is used to represent current class and B is used to
represent current thread.
The code in listing 4.0 shows a HARPO/L program. It has two threads. The
thread t0 implements a method and the thread t1 calls the method. In the next
sections, we will use this code to show the translation of HARPO/L constructs.
(class Counter
constructor()
public proc increment(in n : int32)
takes count
pre count >= 0 && n > 0
pre Isint32(count+n)
post count== count + n
gives count
obj count : int32 := 0
(thread (t0)
(while true
(accept increment(in n : int32)
count := count + n
accept)
while)
thread)
(thread (t1) claim count
count := 0
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increment(1)
assert count == 1
thread)
class)
Listing 4.0: A HARPO/L program with specications
4.1.0 Classes
Each class is translated to a constant in Boogie program.
Tr[(class C members class)]H1;H2;P =
const unique C : ClassName;
Tr[members]H1;H2;P ;
the unique modier declares that the value of the constant di¤ers from other unique
constants. Translation of members is denoted by Tr [members ]H1;H2;P meaning func-
tion Tr is applied to all the members. For instance, the translation of class Counter
in listing 4.0 is the following code:
const unique Counter : ClassName;
A class may implement one or more interfaces. To express subtyping in Boogie,
<: is used. For example, if class C implements interface J , the translation in Boogie
is the following code:
Tr[(class C implements J : : : class)]H1;H2;P =
const unique C : ClassName <: J ;
which means that J is the only direct parent of C.
4.1.1 Interfaces
An interface is translated to a constant in Boogie:
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Tr[(interface K members interface)]H1;H2;P =
const unique K : ClassName;
4.1.2 Fields
The translation of each eld produces a unique Field value as follows:
Tr[obj f : T := E]H1;H2;P =
const unique C:f : Field Tr[T ]H1;H2;P ;
Boogie allows using . character in identier names. The name of the class is
prepended to the eld name. For example, the Counter class has a eld count which
is translated to:
const unique Counter.count : Field int;
4.1.3 Constants
Constants are translated to constants in Boogie. The value of the constant is declared
by an axiom.
Tr[const x : T := E]H1;H2;P =
const x : Tr[T ]H1;H2;P ;
axiom Df [E]H1;H2;P && x == Tr[E]H1;H2;P ;
4.1.4 Types
In HARPO/L, types are primitive types, references to objects, permission type and
arrays. The primitive types include integers, reals and Boolean.
Types  ! int8 j int16 j int32 j int64 j real16 j real32 j real64 j bool j CName j
Perm j T [N ]
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The translation of types is as follows:
Tr[int8]H1;H2;P = int
Tr[int16]H1;H2;P = int
Tr[int32]H1;H2;P = int
Tr[int64]H1;H2;P = int
Tr[int]H1;H2;P = int
Tr[real16]H1;H2;P = real
Tr[real32]H1;H2;P = real
Tr[real64]H1;H2;P = real
Tr[real]H1;H2;P = real
Tr[bool]H1;H2;P = bool
Tr[CName]H1;H2;P = Ref where CName is a reference to an instance of a class
Tr[Perm]H1;H2;P = Perm
Tr[T [N ]]H1;H2;P = ArrayRef Tr[T ]H1;H2;P
4.1.5 Expressions
HARPO/L expressions include arithmetic and logical operators. Translation is done
by two functions. First, the well-denedness of an expression is checked by translation
function Df . It generates a Boogie predicate which checks whether an expression is
well dened in HARPO/L. For example, the expression x=y is dened if y is not zero.
Second, a HARPO/L expression E is translated to an equivalent Boogie expression
by Tr.
The Tr and Df functions are parameterized by two heap parameters H1 and H2
and one permission parameter P . Translation of expressions is based on H1 and
translation of expressions with apostrophe is based on H2. In two state expressions
(postconditions), both parameters must be provided. However, in single state expres-
sions, the second heap, H2, can be blank.
Df [E => F ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P
Df [E <= F ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P
72
Df [E <=> F ]H1;H2;P = Df [F ]H1;H2;P =n Df [E]H1;H2;P
Df [E =n F ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P
Df [E n= F ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P
Df [E]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P
Df [E c F ]H1;H2;P =
Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P with c being = , = , < , _< , >_ , >
Df [E  F ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P with  being +,-,*
Df [E = F ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P =n Tr[F ]H1;H2;P 6= 0
Df [E mod F ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P =n Tr[F ]H1;H2;P 6= 0
Df [E:f ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n
CanRead(E:f)H1;H2;P where E:fs type is primitive and not integer
Df [E:f ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n CanRead(E:f)H1;H2;P =n
Isint(E:f)H1;H2;P where E:fs type is integer
Df [E:f ]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P where E:fs type is not primitive
Df [E 0]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H2; ;P
Df [E[F ]]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P =n
0  Tr[F ]H1;H2;P =n Tr[F ]H1;H2;P < length(Tr[E]H1;H2;P ) =n
CanRead(E[F ])H1;H2;P where E[F ]s type is primitive and not integer
Df [E[F ]]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P =n
0  Tr[F ]H1;H2;P =n Tr[F ]H1;H2;P < length(Tr[E]H1;H2;P ) =n
CanRead(E[F ])H1;H2;P =n
Isint(E:f)H1;H2;P where E[F ]s type is integer
Df [E[F ]]H1;H2;P = Df [E]H1;H2;P =n Df [F ]H1;H2;P =n 0  Tr[F ]H1;H2;P =n
Tr[F ]H1;H2;P < length(Tr[E]H1;H2;P ) where E[F ]s type is not primitive
Tr[E => F ]H1;H2;P = Tr[E]H1;H2;P ==> Tr[F ]H1;H2;P
Tr[E <= F ]H1;H2;P = Tr[F ]H1;H2;P ==> Tr[E]H1;H2;P
Tr[E <=> F ]H1;H2;P = Tr[E]H1;H2;P <==> Tr[E]H1;H2;P
Tr[E =n F ]H1;H2;P = Tr[E]H1;H2;P =n Tr[F ]H1;H2;P
Tr[E n= F ]H1;H2;P = Tr[E]H1;H2;P n= Tr[F ]H1;H2;P
Tr[E]H1;H2;P =!Tr[E]H1;H2;P
Tr[E c F ]H1;H2;P =
Tr[E]H1;H2;P c Tr[F ]H1;H2;P with c being = , = , < , _< , >_ , >
Tr[E  F ]H1;H2;P = Tr[E]H1;H2;P  Tr[F ]H1;H2;P with  being +, -, *
Tr[E = F ]H1;H2;P = Tr[E]H1;H2;P = Tr[F ]H1;H2;P
Tr[E mod F ]H1;H2;P = Tr[E]H1;H2;P mod Tr[F ]H1;H2;P
Tr[E:f ]H1;H2;P = H1[Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ]
Tr[E 0]H1;H2;P = Tr[E]H2; ;P
Tr[E[F ]]H1;H2;P = ArrayH1[Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; T r[F ]H1;H2;P ]
73
4.1.6 Statements
HARPO/L programs will have undergone some preprocessing prior to translation.
We can assume that the input program being translated has following properties:
0. Prex this has been added to all references to elds or methods in the scope of
a class. For instance, if a class declares a eld F , each reference of F has been
changed to this.F in that class.
1. All local variables of a class are promoted to elds in that class.
Considering these properties of a program, the translation of statements is de-
scribed in this section.
 Local Variable Declaration
Provided that local variables are converted as elds of the class prior to translation,
the remaining of translation of local variable declaration, is shown in below:
Tr[obj f : T := E block]H1;H2;P =
AddPermission(this:f)H1;H2;P ;
assert Df [E]H1;H2;P ;
H1[this; C:f ] := Tr[E]H1;H2;P ;
assert Isint(this:f)H1;H2;P ; where f is integer
Tr[block]H1;H2;P ;
RemovePermission(this:f)H1;H2;P ;
First, full permission on variable f is added to the thread. Then the heap is
updated by initial value of the variable after checking it is well-dened. A local
variable is dened in its scope and it is not possible to access it out of its dened
scope. As a result, after translation of the code in the scope of the variable, the
thread loses permission on the variable.
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 Assignment
Based on the fact that local variables are promoted to elds prior to transla-
tion, the only assignments are updating elds and elements of arrays. Additionally,
HARPO/L does not allow updating elds with reference types. Consequently, the
right-hand side of an assignment can only be expression with a primitive type.
Translation of assignment checks that all involved expressions are well-dened.
Then, it checks that the thread has write permission on the eld. Finally, it updates
the heap based on the new value.
Tr[E:f := F ]H1;H2;P =
assert Df [E]H1;H2;P ;
assert Df [F ]H1;H2;P ;
assert CanWrite(E:f)H1;H2;P ;
H1[Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; C:f ] := Tr[F ]H1;H2;P ;
assert Isint(E:f)H1;H2;P ; where E:f is integer
Array update checks that all expressions are well-dened. Then it checks that the
thread has write permission on the element and read permission on the index. The
ArrayHeap is updated based on the new value.
Tr[E[F ] := G]H1;H2;P =
assert Df [E[F ]]H1;H2;P ;
assert Df [G]H1;H2;P ;
assert CanWrite(E[F ])H1;H2;P ;
ArrayH1[Tr[E]H1;H2;P ; T r[F ]H1;H2;P ] := Tr[G]H1;H2;P ;
assert Isint(E[F ])H1;H2;P ; where E[F ] is integer
 if Statement
To translate an if statement, rst it is checked that the guard is dened. Then it
translates HARPO/L if statement into Boogies if statement.
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Tr[(if (E) then S0 else S1 if)]H1;H2;P =
assert Df [E]H1;H2;P ;
if (Tr[E]H1;H2;P ) fTr[S0]H1;H2;Pg else fTr[S1]H1;H2;Pg;
The example in listing 4.1 shows a HARPO/L program implemented with an if
statement.
(class C
constructor()
proc m(in x:real32, out y:bool)
takes n@0.5
post x < n ==> y == 1
post x >= n ==> y == 0
gives n@0.5
obj n : real32 := 100
(thread (t0)
(while true
(accept m(in x:real, out y:bool)
(if x < n
y := 1
else
y := 0
if)
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 4.1: A HARPO/L program that illustrates if statement
The translation of the if section of the example in listing 4.1 is shown below.
First, it checks that the thread has enough permission on guard expression. Then it
translates the if statement in HARPO/L to an if statement in Boogie.
assert Permission[this, C.x] > 0.0 && Permission[this, C.n] > 0.0;
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if (Heap[this, C.x] < Heap[this, C.n])
{assert Permission[this, C.y] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.y] := true;}
else
{assert Permission[this, C.y] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.y] := false;}
 While Statement
To translate awhile statement, the translation stores the value of the heaps in old
heap variables oldH and oldArrayH on entering to the loop. Then it translates the
while statement in HARPO/L to a while statement in Boogie. The loop invariant
is translated to a loop invariant in Boogie and it is checked whether the invariant is
dened. Additionally, it adds an invariant to assert the guard is well-dened. The
encoding also adds an invariant to assert that the locations of the heap which are
not modied by the loop hold their values. This invariant is generated based on the
locations that the invariant does not specify full permission on them. The reason
for this invariant is that Boogie havocs the modied variables by the loop and then
assumes the invariant. Therefore, if an array variable such as heap is changed, the
invariant must assert the unchanged locations too.
Tr[(while E invariant J stmts while)]H;sH;P =
oldH := H;
oldArrayH := ArrayH;
while (Tr[E]H;oldH;P )
invariant Df [J ]H;oldH;P && Tr[J ]H;oldH;P ;
invariant Df [E]H;oldH;P ;
invariant (forall hxi r : Ref; f : Field x :: !(r:f in ModifiedV ariable(J))
==> H[r; f ] == oldH[r; f ]);
invariant (forall hxi r : ArrayRef x; f : int :: !(r[f ] in ModifiedV ariable(J))
==> ArrayH[r; f ] == oldArrayH[r; f ]);
fTr[stmts]H;oldH;Pg
77
For instance, the method sqrt in listing 3.8 is implemented by while loop. The
translation of while part is as follows:
oldHeap := Heap;
oldArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
while ((Heap[this, Math.n]+1) * (Heap[this, Math.n]+1) <=
Heap[this, Math.m])
invariant Permission[this, Math.n] == 1.0 &&
(Heap[this, Math.n]*Heap[this, Math.n] <= Heap[this, Math.m]);
invariant (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r == this && f == Math.n) ==>
Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
{
assert Permission[this, Math.n] == 1.0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Math.n]);
Heap[this, Math.n] := Heap[this, Math.n] + 1;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Math.n]);
}
 For Statement
The for loop is translated to a while loop in Boogie.
Tr[(for x : E invariant J do stmts for)]H;oldH;P =
oldH := H;
oldArrayH := ArrayH;
while (x < Tr[E]H;oldH;P )
invariant Df [J ]H;oldH;P && Tr[J ]H;oldH;P ;
invariant Df [E]H;oldH;P ;
invariant (forall hxi r : Ref; f : Field x ::!(r:f in ModifiedV ariable(J))
==> H[r; f ] == oldH[r; f ]);
invariant (forall hxi r : ArrayRef x; f : int ::!(r[f ] in ModifiedV ariable(J))
==> ArrayH[r; f ] == oldArrayH[r; f ]);
f
Tr[stmts]H;oldH;P ;
x := x+ 1;
g
For instance, the method Add in listing 3.9 is implemented with a for loop. The
translation of the for loop is as follows:
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oldHeap := Heap;
oldArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
while(Heap[this, Math.i] < Heap[this, Math.n])
invariant Permission[this, Math.i] == 1.0 && 0 <= Heap[this, Math.i]
&& Heap[this, Math.i] <= Heap[this, Math.n];
invariant Permission[this, Math.sum] == 1.0 &&
Heap[this, Math.sum] == oldHeap[this, Math.sum] +
Heap[this, Math.i];
invariant (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f==Math.i)) &&
(!(r==this && f==Math.sum)) ==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
{
assert Permission[this, Math.i] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, Math.sum] == 1.0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Math.sum]);
Heap[this, Math.sum] := Heap[this, Math.sum] + 1;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Math.sum]);
Heap[this, Math.i] := Heap[this, Math.i] + 1;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Math.i]);
}
4.1.7 Threads
A Thread is a block of code declared inside a class. It can consist of statements and
method implementations. It may be annotated with a claim specication to declare
its initial permission on locations of the object.
The thread declaration is translated to a procedure in Boogie. The procedure has
input parameter this denoting the object that the thread is running in. To track the
permissions of a thread, local variables Permission and ArrayPermission are declared
in the beginning of the generated procedure with zero initial permission. Also, old
variables are declared which will be used to store the prior states in translation of
statements. In the case that the thread was annotated with a claim specication,
the permission variables receive the permissions on the specied locations. Also, we
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assume the locations in claim specication, are equal to their declared initial values.
Finally, the code inside the thread is translated.
Tr[(thread B claim init_Permission block thread)]H;sH;P =
procedure C:B(this : Ref)
modies H; ArrayH;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
f
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall hxi r : Ref; f : Field x :: Permission[r; f ] == 0:0);
var ArrayPermission : ArrayPermissionType where
(forall hxi r : ArrayRef x; f : int ::
ArrayPermission[r; f ] == 0:0);
var oldH; H_tmp : HeapType;
var oldArrayH; ArrayH_tmp : ArrayHeapType;
var oldPermission : PermissionType;
var oldArrayPermission : ArrayPermissionType;
Tr[claim init_Permission]H;oldH;Permission;
Tr[block]H;oldH;Permission;
g
Tr[claim init_Permission]H;oldH;P =
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in init_PermissionAddPermission(PM)H;oldH;P ;
oldH := H;
oldArrayH := ArrayH;
havoc H;
havoc ArrayH;
foreach location E:f in init_Permission
assume H[Tr[E]H;oldH;P ; C:f ] == Tr[InitE:f ]H;oldH;P ;
foreach location E[f ] in init_Permission
assume ArrayH[Tr[E]H;oldH;P ; T r[f ]H;oldH;P ] == Tr[InitE[f ]]H;oldH;P ;
assume (forall hxi r : Ref; f : Field x ::
!(r:f in ModifiedV ariable(init_Permission)) ==>
H[r; f ] == oldH[r; f ]);
assume (forall hxi r : ArrayRef x; f : int ::
!(r[f ] in ModifiedV ariable(init_Permission)) ==>
ArrayH[r; f ] == oldArrayH[r; f ]);
For instance, the translation of thread t1 of the Counter class in listing 4.0 is shown
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below:
procedure Counter.t1(this : Ref)
modies Heap, ArrayHeap;
requires dtype(this) <: Counter;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var ArrayPermission : ArrayPermissionType where
(forall <x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: ArrayPermission [r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, Heap_tmp : HeapType;
var oldArrayHeap, ArrayHeap_tmp : ArrayHeapType;
var oldPermission : PermissionType;
var oldArrayPermission : ArrayPermissionType;
//claim
Permission[this, Counter.count] := Permission[this, Counter.count] +
1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, Counter.count] == 0; //intial value
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f==Counter.count)
==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
/* translation of body */
}
As shown, the thread is translated as procedure Counter.t1. First, two permission
variables for elds and elements of arrays are declared. Next, the claim is translated
which is full permission on count. Then the claimed location is assumed to have its
initial value. Finally, the body of the thread is translated.
4.1.8 Methods
In HARPO/L, a method consists of a method declaration and method implementa-
tion. A method declaration is specied by contracts containing permission speci-
cations and assertions. The permission specications are declared with takes and
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gives clauses. Furthermore, the assertions are declared with pre and post clauses
which specify conditions on the variables. The syntax of a method declaration with
specications is shown below:
MethodDeclararion 
proc Name(Parameters)
takes in_Permission
pre preconsition
post postcondition
gives out_permission
The method implementation is declared inside a thread and consists of a sequence
of statements. Translation of a method implementation generates a block of code
inside of a thread. To translate a method implementation, both specications and
implementation must be considered which is shown below.
Tr[(accept M (Parameters) body accept)]H;sH;P =
goto M ;
M :
foreach variable in ins[Parameters]
fHavocNewLoc(variable)H;sH;P ;
AddPermission(variable@0:5)H;sH;P ; g
foreach variable in outs[Parameters]
fHavocNewLoc(variable)H;sH;P ;
AddPermission(variable)H;sH;P ; g
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in in_Permission
fHavocNewLoc(PMhvariablei)H;sH;P ;
AddPermission(PM)H;sH;P ; g
assert Df [precondition]H;oldH;P ;
Assuming(precondition)H;oldH;P ;
preH := H;
preArrayH := ArrayH;
Tr[Body]H; ;P ;
assert Df [postcondition]preH;H;P ;
assert Tr[postcondition]preH;H;P ;
foreach variable in outs
RemovePermission(variable)H;preH;P ;
foreach variable in ins
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RemovePermission(variable@0:5)H;preH;P ;
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in out_permission
RemovePermission(PM)H;preH;P ;
goto Done;
Done :
Assuming(Cond)H;sH;P =
oldH := H;
oldArrayH := ArrayH;
havoc H;
havoc ArrayH;
assume Tr[Cond]H;oldH;P ;
assume (forall hxi r : Ref; f : Field x :: !(r:f in ModifiedV ariable(Cond))
==> H[r; f ] == oldH[r; f ]);
assume (forall hxi r : ArrayRef x; f : int :: !(r[f ] in ModifiedV ariable(Cond))
==> ArrayH[r; f ] == oldArrayH[r; f ]);
First, the thread recieves read permission on input parameters and write permis-
sion on output parameters. These locations are havocked to arbitrary values. In the
translation, two functions ins[Parameters] and outs[Parameters] are used to extract
the input and output parameters respectively.
ins[Parameters] = fp j in p Prametersg
outs[Parameters] = fp j out p Prametersg
Then, the permission specications for pre-state are translated. The takes speci-
cation represents the permissions which will be transferred to the method from the
caller at the beginning of the method. To translate takes, for each permission map
specied in a takes clause, the permission variables of the thread are increased by
those permissions. Also, all taken locations that thread had no permission on must
be havocked too.
Second, the precondition is translated. It is asserted that the precondition is well-
dened. Then the precondition is assumed which is shown by Assuming operation.
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It havocs the heaps and then assumes the precondition. Also, it assumes that the
locations not specied in the precondition, remain unchanged.
Third, the body of the method, which is a sequence of statements, is translated.
Translation stores the value of the heaps prior to translation of body in preH and
preArrayH, which will be used in two state postconditions. Then it translates the
body of the method.
Fourth, the postconditions are translated. In fact, the implementation of the
method must establish the postconditions. The translation asserts that the postcon-
ditions are well-dened and true.
Finally, the gives clause is translated. The gives specication represents the
permissions which will be transferred from the method to the caller. To translate
gives, for each permission map specied in gives clause, the permission variable
of the thread is decreased by those permissions. Based on the fact that method
parameters are dened only in the scope of the method, the permissions on parameters
are removed in the end of method too.
Furthermore, the start of translation is labeled by the name of the method and
there is a goto to the rst of methods implementation in the beginning of translation.
Also, the end of the accept block is labeled by Done and at the end of implementation
of method, there is a goto to the end of the accept block. The reason for using labels is
the fact that HARPO/L allows multiple methods to be implemented by one accept
statement. To translate choice in an accept statement, the list of gotos at the
beginning must include multiple method names. For instance, if there is a choice
in an accept statement with methods m0 and m1, the goto list must include both
of them: goto m0,m1;. We use the same translation methodology for the second
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method.
For instance, translation of method increment of listing 4.0 is as follows:
goto increment;
increment:
//add permission
if (Permission[this, Counter.n] == 0.0)
{havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, Counter.n] := Heap_tmp[this, Counter.n];}
Permission[this, Counter.n] := Permission[this, Counter.n] + 0.5;
if (Permission[this, Counter.count] == 0.0)
{havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, Counter.count] := Heap_tmp[this, Counter.count];}
Permission[this, Counter.count] := Permission[this, Counter.count] + 1.0;
//precondition
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, Counter.count] >= 0 && Heap[this, Counter.n] > 0;
assume Isint32(Heap[this, Counter.count] + Heap[this, Counter.n]);
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !((r==this && f == Counter.count) &&
(r==this && f == Counter.n)) ==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//body
preHeap := Heap;
preArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
assert Permission[this, Counter.count] == 1.0;
assert Permission[this, Counter.n] > 0.0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Counter.count]);
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Counter.n]);
Heap[this, Counter.count] := Heap[this, Counter.count] +
Heap[this, Counter.n];
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Counter.count]);
//postcondition
assert Heap[this, Counter.count] == preHeap[this, Counter.count] +
Heap[this, Counter.n];
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Counter.count]);
//remove permission
assert Permission[this, Counter.count] == 1.0;
Permission[this, Counter.count] := Permission[this, Counter.count] - 1.0;
assert Permission[this, Counter.n] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, Counter.n] := Permission[this, Counter.n] - 0.5;
goto done_increment;
done_increment:
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As shown, the start of the method is labeled by the name of the method. First,
the thread receives read permission on the input parameter n and full permission on
eld count. These locations are havoced too. Then it assumes the precondition to be
valid. To achieve this, it havocs the heap and assumes locations to have the values
specied in the precondition. Also, it must be assumed that variables not mentioned
by the precondition keep their values.
Next, the heaps are stored in preH and preArrayH and then the body is translated.
It is checked that the thread has enough permission on variables count and n. Then
it updates count with the new value.
Finally, the translation asserts the postcondition, which claims count has increased
by n. Then the thread loses its permissions on count and n. In the end, there is a
goto to done_increment which labels the end of the methods implementation.
4.1.9 Method Call
Translation of a call to method E:M with input parameters and output parameters
is shown below:
Tr(E:M(Arguments))H;sH;P =
preH := H;
preArrayH := ArrayH;
assert Df [E]H;preH;P ;
assert Df [Arguments]H;preH;P ;
var that : Ref ;
that := E;
foreach parami in parameters  declare parami;
foreach parami in ins  parami := Tr[argi]H;preH;P ;
assert Df [precondition[this=that]]H; ;P ;
assert Tr[precondition[this=that]]H; ;P ;
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in in_Permission
RemovePermission(PM [this=that])H; ;P ;
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foreach PermissionMap "PM" in out_Permission
fHavocNewLoc(PM [this=that]hvariablei)H; ;P ;
AddPermission(PM [this=that])H; ;P ; g
assert Df [postcondition[this=that]]preH;H;P ;
Assuming(postcondition[this=that])preH;H;P ;
foreach parami in outs
fCanWrite(Tr[argi])H;preH;P ;
Tr[argi]H;preH;P := parami; g
The translation rst stores the value of the heaps in preH and preArrayH before
a method call. Then it checks that all involving expressions are well-dened.
Establishing specications of pre-state of a call is the responsibility of the caller.
As a result, the precondition is checked to be dened and valid. Moreover a method
loses permission on locations specied by the takes keyword. The specications of a
method are written from the methods point of view. As a result, before translating
the specication, there is a replacement step. For the reference E and parameters of
the method, new variables are declared. Prior to translating the precondition, the
input arguments are copied to the associated variables. Then the specications are
translated based on these variables.
After a method call, the callee receives permissions for locations annotated by
gives. These locations must be havoced if the thread had no permission on them.
Then, it asserts the postcondition is well-deined. Next, it assumes the postcondition.
To achieve this, it havocs the heap and assumes the postcondition. Finally, the output
variables are copied to output arguments.
For example, the translation of method call increment in listing 4.0 is as follows:
preHeap := Heap;
preArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
that := this;
//copy arguments
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assert Isint32(Heap[this, Counter.i]);
n := Heap[this, Counter.i];
assert Isint32(n);
//precondition
assert Heap[that, Counter.count] >= 0 && n > 0;
assert Isint32(Heap[that, Counter.count] + n);
//remove permission
assert Permission[this, Counter.count] == 1.0;
Permission[this, Counter.count] := Permission[this, Counter.count] - 1.0;
//add permission
if (Permission[this, Counter.count] == 0.0)
{havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, Counter.count] := Heap_tmp[this, Counter.count];}
Permission[this, Counter.count] := Permission[this, Counter.count] + 1.0;
//postcondition
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume (Heap[that, Counter.count] == preHeap[that, Counter.count] + n);
assume (forall<x> t:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(t==that && f==Counter.count)
==> Heap[t,f] == oldHeap[t,f]));
assert Heap[this, Counter.count] == 1;
The translation stores the value of the heaps in the beginning of translating the
method call. A new variable, "that" is declared to store the object reference of the
method. Also, variable n is declared which stores the value of argument i. Next, the
precondition is asserted; this checks the value of count and n. Then, the thread loses
the permission required by the method, which is full permission on count.
After the method call, the thread receives the returning permission, which is
full permission on count. Also, this location is havoced. Next, the postcondition is
translated. It assumes the eld count has been incremented by n and other elds have
remained unchanged. In this example, the value of count was zero before the method
call and it is asserted it is one after method call.
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4.1.10 Constructor
The constructor of a class is translated to a procedure in Boogie. The input parameter
of the procedure is this denoting the class. The constructor is allowed to modify all
elds of the class. Translation of a constructor is illustrated in below:
Tr[constructor (Parameters)]H;sH;P =
procedure C:C (Ref this)
modies H; ArrayH;
modies LockPermission; ArrayLockPermission;
free requires this <: C;
f
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall hxi r : Ref; f : Field x :: Permission[r; f ] == 0:0);
var ArrayPermission : ArrayPermissionType where
(forall hxi r : ArrayRef x; f : int ::
ArrayPermission[r; f ] == 0:0);
var oldH : HeapType;
var oldArrayH : ArrayHeapType;
oldH := H;
oldArrayH := ArrayH;
havoc H;
havoc ArrayH;
//add permission on in parameters
foreach PermissionMap PM in ins[Parameters]
AddPermission(PM@0:5)H; ;P ermission;
//check claims
foreach field f" defined in C do
assert sum of claimed permission on f<= 1:0;
//initializing elds
foreach field f defined in C do
fTr[f ]H; ;P ermission := Tr[InitExpf ]H; ;P ermission; g
// check class claim
foreach PermissioMap \PM\ in the claim of the class claim PMs
AddPemission(PM)H;oldH;LockPermission;
//invariant
assert Df [J ]H;oldH;LockPermission;
assert Tr[J ]H;oldH;LockPermission;
g
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Tr[acc PMs]H;sH;P =
foreach PermissioMap PM in PMs  CanAccess(PM)H;sH;P ;
First, the translation havocs the heaps which gives arbitrary values to the heap
locations. Second, the translation adds permission on the input parameters of con-
structor. Third, the translation checks that the sum of claims on each eld is not
more than one. Fourth, it initializes the elds of the class with their declared initial
values.
Fifth, it translates the claim of the class which increases the permission of the
lock based on permission maps in the claim specication. Finally, it asserts that
the invariant is well-dened and is valid. An invariant has two types of specication.
One is permission specication, annotated with acc keyword. The second type is
pure assertions, declaring conditions on variables. The translation of acc is shown in
translation too, which checks having the specied permission.
For instance, the translation of the constructor of Counter class in listing 4.0 is
shown below:
procedure Counter.Counter(this:Ref)
requires dtype(this) <: Counter;
modies Heap;
modies LockPermission;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var ArrayPermission : ArrayPermissionType where
(forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: ArrayPermission [r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap : HeapType;
var oldArrayHeap: ArrayHeapType;
oldHeap := Heap;
oldArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
havoc Heap;
havoc ArrayHeap;
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//check claims
Permission[this, Counter.count] := Permission[this, Counter.count] +
1.0;
assert (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] <= 1.0);
//initialize
Heap[this, Counter.count] := 0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Counter.count]);
}
In this example, rst it havocs the heaps in entrance to constructor. Next, it
updates the Permission variable based on declared claims and checks that the sum of
claims on each location is not greater than one. In this example, there is one claim
specication and its claimed permission is not greater than one. Next, it initializes
the eld count with its initial value.
4.1.11 Locks
Translation of locks is done based on the invariant of the class. Assuming J is the
invariant of a class, the translation of a lock is shown in below:
Tr[(with l
takes in_Permission
gives out_Permission
stmts)]H;oldH;P =
var that : Ref ;
that := Tr[l]H;oldH;LockPermission;
AssumingPermission(Jacc[this=that])H;oldH;LockPermission;
assert Df [Jcond[this=that]]H;oldH;LockPermission;
Assuming(Jcond[this=that])H;oldH;LockPermission;
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in in_Permission
RemovePermission(PM)H;oldH;LockPermission;
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in in_Permission
AddPermission(PM)H;oldH;P ;
==body
Tr[stmts]H;oldH;P+LockPermission;
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in out_Permission
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RemovePermission(PM)H;oldH;P ;
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in out_Permission
AddPermission(PM)H;oldH;LockPermission;
assert Df [J [this=that]]H;oldH;LockPermission;
assert Tr[J [this=that]]H;oldH;LockPermission;
AssumingPermission(PermCond)H;oldH;LockP =
havoc LockP ;
havoc ArrayLockP ;
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in PermCond
fHavocNewLoc(PMhvariablei)H;oldH;ZeroP ;
assume CanAccess(PM)H;oldH;LockP ; g
assume (forall hxi r : Ref; f : Field x ::!(r:f in ModifiedV ariable(PermCond))
==> LockP [r; f ] == 0:0);
assume (forall hxi r : ArrayRef x; f : int ::!(r[f ] in ModifiedV ariable(PermCond))
==> ArrayLockP [r; f ] == 0:0);
First, the invariant is assumed to be true on entrance to the lock. A new variable
that is declared to store the reference to the lock. It will replace this in translation
of the invariant. An invariant has two kinds of specications, permission specica-
tions, declared with the acc keyword, and condition specications. Translation of the
permission part is shown by the AssumingPermission operation which assumes the
specied permissions. These locations must be havoced to arbitrary values too. We
also assume that the permission of locations not specied in acc specications are
zero.
After assuming the permission part of the invariant, we can translate the condition
part of invariant. It is asserted that the condition part is dened. Then, the condition
part is assumed.
A lock may be annotated with a takes specication. This leads to transferring
specied permissions from the lock to the thread. As shown in the translation, the
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lock loses permission and the thread receives those permissions. Next, the statements
inside the lock are translated. Within this translation, the permissions of the thread
and lock must be summed for checks of readability and writability. Also, a lock can be
annotated with a gives specication, which leads to transferring specied permissions
from the thread to the lock. As shown in the translation, the thread loses the specied
permissions and the lock receives them.
Finally, the translation must check that the invariant holds on release of the lock.
It asserts that the lock permission variables hold the specied permissions. Also, it
asserts the condition assertions of the invariant are dened and true.
The translation of lock is shown in listing 3.6. First, the translation havocs the
locations on which the thread has no permission. Then, it assumes the invariant is
dened and true. Next, it translates the assignment by considering the permissions
of both thread and lock. Finally, it asserts the invariant.
that := this;
//assume invariant
//acc count@0.5
havoc LockPermission;
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, Counter.count] := Heap_tmp[that, Counter.count];
assume LockPermission[that, Counter.count] == 0.5;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f: Field x :: !(r==that && f==Counter.count) ==>
LockPermission[r, f] == 0.0);
//0 <= count
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[that, Counter.count] >= 0.0;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==that && f == Counter.count)
==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//lock body
assert ((Permission[this, Counter.count] +
LockPermission[this, Counter.count]) == 1.0);
Heap[this, Counter.count] := Heap[this, Counter.count] + 1.0;
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//assert inv
assert LockPermission[that, Counter.count] == 0.5;
assert Heap[that, Counter.count] >= 0.0;
4.1.12 Parallelism
Parallel blocks may be specied with a claim specication, denoting their required
permissions. At rst, the main thread loses permission according to claimed permis-
sions by parallel blocks. Then the co blocks are translated respectively.
Tr[(co claim claim1 stmts1 jj claim claim2 stmts2 co)]H;oldH;P =
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in claim1 RemovePermission(PM)H;oldH;P ;
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in claim2 RemovePermission(PM)H;oldH;P ;
var Permission1 : PermissionType;
havoc Permission1;
assume (forall hxi r : ref; f : Field x :: Permission1[r; f ] == 0:0);
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in claim1
AddPermission(PM)H;oldH;Permission1;
Tr[stmts1]H;oldH;Permission1;
var Permission2 : PermissionType;
havoc Permission2;
foreach PermissionMap "PM" in claim2
AddPermission(PM)H;oldH;Permission2;
Tr[stmts2]H;oldH;Permission2;
oldP := P ;
oldArrayP := ArrayP ;
foreach location "lc" in Permission1
AddPermission(lc@Permission1(lc))H;oldH;P ;
foreach location "lc" in Permission2
AddPermission(lc@Permission2(lc))H;oldH;P ;
To translate the rst co block, the new variable, Permission1, is declared to
track permission. If the co block is prexed with a claim, the permission variable
is updated according to the claimed permissions. Then the statements of the child
thread are translated using only the Permission1 variable to check read and write
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access. This procedure is repeated for the remaining co blocks. At the end, the
permission variable of the main thread receives the remaining permissions of the co
blocks.
The translation of the co statement in listing 3.7 is shown below. In the translation
of co statements, the parent thread loses the claimed permissions on variables a, sum1
and sum2. Then the co1 block is translated. It receives read permission on a and full
permission on sum1. Then the co2 block is translated with the same methodology.
In the end, the main thread receives the permissions of both threads.
//parent thread t0
assert Permission[this, Math.a] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, Math.a] := Permission[this, Math.a] - 0.5;
assert Permission[this, Math.sum1] == 1.0;
Permission[this, Math.sum1] := Permission[this, Math.sum1] - 1.0;
assert Permission[this, Math.a] >= 0.25;
Permission[this, Math.a] := Permission[this, Math.a] - 0.25;
assert Permission[this, Math.sum2] == 1.0;
Permission[this, Math.sum2] := Permission[this, Math.sum2] - 1.0;
Permission1[this, Math.a] := Permission1[this, Math.a] + 0.5; //co1
Permission1[this, Math.sum1] := Permission1[this, Math.sum1] + 1.0;
assert Permission1[this, Math.a] > 0.0 ;
assert Permission1[this, Math.sum1] == 1.0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Math.a]);
Heap[this, Math.sum1] := Heap[this, Math.a] + 1;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Math.sum1]);
Permission2[this, Math.a] := Permission2[this, Math.a] + 0.25; //co2
Permission2[this, Math.sum2] := Permission2[this, Math.sum2] + 1.0;
assert Permission2[this, Math.a] > 0.0;
assert Permission2[this, Math.sum2] == 1.0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Math.a]);
Heap[this, Math.sum2] := Heap[this, Math.a] + 1;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Math.sum2]);
//Add permission to parent thread
oldPermission := Permission;
havoc Permission;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f: Field x :: (Permission[r, f] ==
oldPermission[r, f] + Permission1[r, f] + Permission2[r, f]));
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Chapter 5
Case Studies
This chapter presents some examples in HARPO/L with their verication. The rst
case shows verication of a program implementing a bu¤er. The second case presents
a merging algorithm. The third one veries three scenarios of permission transfer.
5.0 Bu¤er
In this example, a bu¤er with specications is shown. The bu¤er is implemented by
an array. Two operations are declared on bu¤er: deposit and fetch. To synchronize
these operations, the variable full is declared. When the value of full is less than
the bu¤er size, the deposit operation is allowed. When the value of full is greater
than zero, the fetch operation is permitted. The front index shows the slot to be
fetched and the rear index shows the rst empty slot. The code in listing 5.0 shows
the implementation.
(class Bu¤er
proc deposit(in value : real)
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proc fetch(out value : real)
obj buf : real[size] := (for i : size do 0 for)
obj front : int32 := 0
obj rear : int32 := 0
obj full : int32 := 0
const size : int32 := 10
(thread (t0) claim front, rear, full, {i:{0,..size} . buf[i]}
(while true
invariant acc front, rear, full, {i:{0,..size} . buf[i]}
invariant (0 _< front /\ front < size) /\
(0 _< rear /\ rear < size) /\
(0 _< full /\ full < size)
invariant ((front + full) mod size = rear)
(accept deposit(in value : real) when (full < size)
buf[rear] := value
rear := (rear + 1) % size
full := full + 1
|
fetch(out ovalue : real) when (0 < full)
ovalue := buf[front]
front := (front + 1) % size
full := full   1
accept)
while)
thread)
class)
Listing 5.0: Bu¤er class
In this code, the thread t0 has full permission on the indices and the array. This
allows modication of them by the methods. Also, the loop is specied with invariants.
The rst invariant asserts full permission on front, rear, full and the array. The second
invariant declares the range of front, rear and full. The last invariant declares the
relation between front, rear and full. The translation of this code is shown in listing
5.1.
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type Ref;
type Field x;
type HeapType = <x>[Ref, Field x]x;
var Heap : HeapType;
type ArrayRef x;
type ArrayHeapType = <x>[ArrayRef x, int] x;
var ArrayHeap : ArrayHeapType;
type Perm = real;
type PermissionType = <x>[Ref, Field x] Perm;
type ArrayPermissionType = <x>[ArrayRef x, int] Perm;
var LockPermission : PermissionType;
var ArrayLockPermission : ArrayPermissionType;
function Length<x>(Field (ArrayRef x)) returns(int);
const unique min8 : int;
axiom min8 ==  128;
const unique max8 : int;
axiom max8 == 127;
const unique min16 : int;
axiom min16 ==  32768;
const unique max16 : int;
axiom max16 == 32767;
const unique min32 : int;
axiom min32 ==  2147483648;
const unique max32 : int;
axiom max32 == 2147483647;
const unique min64 : int;
axiom min64 ==  9223372036854775808;
const unique max64 : int;
axiom max64 == 9223372036854775807;
function Isint8(int) returns(bool);
axiom (forall x : int :: Isint8(x) <==> min8 <= x && x <= max8);
function Isint16(int) returns(bool);
axiom (forall x : int :: Isint16(x) <==> min16 <= x && x <= max16);
function Isint32(int) returns(bool);
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axiom (forall x : int :: Isint32(x) <==> min32 <= x && x <= max32);
function Isint64(int) returns(bool);
axiom (forall x : int :: Isint64(x) <==> min64 <= x && x <= max64);
type ClassName;
function dtype(Ref) returns(ClassName);
const unique Bu¤er : ClassName;
const unique Bu¤er.buf : Field (ArrayRef real);
const unique Bu¤er.front : Field int;
const unique Bu¤er.rear : Field int;
const unique Bu¤er.full : Field int;
const unique Bu¤er.size : int;
axiom Bu¤er.size == 10;
const unique Bu¤er.value : Field real;
const unique Bu¤er.ovalue : Field real;
procedure Bu¤er.t0(this : Ref)
modies Heap, ArrayHeap;
requires dtype(this) <: Bu¤er;
{
var oldHeap, preHeap, Heap_tmp: HeapType;
var oldArrayHeap, preArrayHeap, ArrayHeap_tmp : ArrayHeapType;
var Permission, oldPermission, prePermission : PermissionType;
var ArrayPermission, oldArrayPermission, preArrayPermission :  -
,!ArrayPermissionType;
//initial permission
oldPermission := Permission;
havoc Permission;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f: Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
//array initial permission
oldArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
havoc ArrayPermission;
assume (forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int:: ArrayPermission[r, f] == 0.0);
//claim front, rear, full
oldPermission := Permission;
havoc Permission;
assume Permission[this, Bu¤er.front] == 1.0;
assume Permission[this, Bu¤er.rear] == 1.0;
assume Permission[this, Bu¤er.full] == 1.0;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == Bu¤er.front) && -
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,! !(r==this && f == Bu¤er.rear) &&
!(r==this && f == Bu¤er.full) ==> Permission[r, f] == oldPermission[r, f -
,!]);
//claim {i:{0,..size} . buf[i]}
oldArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
havoc ArrayPermission;
assume (forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (r == Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf]) && -
,! (0 <= f && f < Bu¤er.size)==>ArrayPermission[r,f] == 1.0);
assume (forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !((r == Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf])  -
,!&& (0 <= f && f < Bu¤er.size))==>
ArrayPermission[r,f] == oldArrayPermission[r,f]);
//initial values of claimed locations
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear] == 0;
assume Heap[this, Bu¤er.front] == 0;
assume Heap[this, Bu¤er.full] == 0;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == Bu¤er.front) && -
,! !(r==this && f == Bu¤er.rear) &&
!(r==this && f == Bu¤er.full) ==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
oldArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
havoc ArrayHeap;
assume (forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: ((r == Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf])  -
,!&& (0 <= f && f < Bu¤er.size)) ==>
ArrayHeap[r, f] == 0.0);
assume (forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !((r == Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf])  -
,!&& (0 <= f && f < Bu¤er.size)) ==>
ArrayHeap[r, f] == oldArrayHeap[r, f]);
oldPermission := Permission;
oldArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
oldHeap := Heap;
oldArrayHeap :=ArrayHeap;
while (true)
invariant Permission[this, Bu¤er.front] == 1.0 &&
Permission[this, Bu¤er.rear] == 1.0 &&
Permission[this, Bu¤er.full] == 1.0 &&
(forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (r == Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf])  -
,!&& (0 <= f && f < Bu¤er.size)==>
ArrayPermission[r,f] == 1.0);
invariant (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == Bu¤er.front) -
,! && !(r==this && f == Bu¤er.rear) &&
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!(r==this && f == Bu¤er.full) ==> Permission[r, f] ==  -
,!oldPermission[r, f]);
invariant (forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !((r == Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf -
,!]) && (0 <= f && f < Bu¤er.size))==>
ArrayPermission[r,f] == oldArrayPermission[r,f]);
invariant (0 <= Heap[this, Bu¤er.front] && Heap[this, Bu¤er.front] <  -
,!Bu¤er.size) &&
(0 <= Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear] && Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear] <  -
,!Bu¤er.size) &&
(0 <= Heap[this, Bu¤er.full] && Heap[this, Bu¤er.full] <=  -
,!Bu¤er.size);
invariant ((Heap[this, Bu¤er.front] + Heap[this, Bu¤er.full]) mod  -
,!Bu¤er.size) == Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear];
invariant (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == Bu¤er.front) -
,! && !(r==this && f == Bu¤er.rear) &&
!(r==this && f == Bu¤er.full) && !(r==this && f ==  -
,!Bu¤er.value) && !(r==this && f == Bu¤er.ovalue)
==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
invariant (forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !((r == Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf -
,!]) && (0 <= f && f < Bu¤er.size))==>
ArrayHeap[r, f] == oldArrayHeap[r, f]);
{
goto deposit, fetch;
deposit:
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.full] > 0.0;
if (Heap[this, Bu¤er.full] < Bu¤er.size)
{
prePermission := Permission;
Permission[this, Bu¤er.value] := Permission[this, Bu¤er.value] + 0.5;
if (prePermission[this, Bu¤er.value] == 0.0)
{
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.value] > 0.0;
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, Bu¤er.value] := Heap_tmp[this, Bu¤er.value];
}
//deposit body
preHeap := Heap;
preArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.rear] > 0.0 && Permission[this,  -
,!Bu¤er.value] > 0.0;
assert ArrayPermission[Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf], Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear]] == -
,! 1.0;
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assert 0 <= Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear] && Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear] <  -
,!Bu¤er.size;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear]);
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf], Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear]] := Heap[this,  -
,!Bu¤er.value];
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.rear] == 1.0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear]);
Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear] := (Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear] + 1) mod Bu¤er.size;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.rear]);
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.full] == 1.0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.full]);
Heap[this, Bu¤er.full] := Heap[this, Bu¤er.full] + 1;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.full]);
//give permission
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.value] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, Bu¤er.value] := Permission[this, Bu¤er.value]   0.5;
}
goto Done;
fetch:
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.full] > 0.0;
if (0 < Heap[this, Bu¤er.full])
{
Permission[this, Bu¤er.ovalue] := Permission[this, Bu¤er.ovalue] + 1.0;
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, Bu¤er.ovalue] := Heap_tmp[this, Bu¤er.ovalue];
//body fetch
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.ovalue] == 1.0 && Permission[this,  -
,!Bu¤er.front] > 0.0;
assert ArrayPermission[Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf], Heap[this, Bu¤er.front]] >  -
,!0.0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.front]);
Heap[this, Bu¤er.ovalue] := ArrayHeap[Heap[this, Bu¤er.buf], Heap[this,  -
,!Bu¤er.front]];
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.front] == 1.0;
assert 0 <= Heap[this, Bu¤er.front] && Heap[this, Bu¤er.front] <  -
,!Bu¤er.size;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.front]);
Heap[this, Bu¤er.front] := (Heap[this, Bu¤er.front] + 1) mod Bu¤er.size;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.front]);
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.full] == 1.0;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.full]);
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Heap[this, Bu¤er.full] := Heap[this, Bu¤er.full]   1;
assert Isint32(Heap[this, Bu¤er.full]);
assert Permission[this, Bu¤er.ovalue] == 1.0;
Permission[this, Bu¤er.ovalue] := Permission[this, Bu¤er.ovalue]   1.0;
}
goto Done;
Done:
}
}
Listing 5.1: Translation of bu¤er class in Boogie
The translation code is given as input to Boogie verier. The Boogie verier
reports successful verication and gives the following message.
Boogie program verier nished with 1 veried, 0 errors
In addition to verifying a correct program, we are interested in introducing errors
into the program to see whether the verier detects the errors. First, we introduce
errors into the program and check the result of verication. Second, we introduce
errors into the specication and then test the result.
 Erroneous Code
An array access must be in the range of array bounds. We modied "ovalue :=
buf[front]" to instead use an incorrect index: "ovalue := buf[front+1]". Accessing this
location is not allowed and can not establish the denedness of array access and gives
the following error:
Error BP5001: This assertion might not hold.
 Erroneous Specication
For the second test, the code is correct but we introduce errors into the specica-
tion. In this example, there are two types of specications: claims and loop invariants.
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Writing the loop invariants is more challenging, because the only way that the ver-
ier will know that the properties of the loop is preserved is by the invariants. For
instance, we change the invariant "((front + full) mod size = rear)" to "((front + full)
mod size < rear)". The verier gives an error on this line and the program is not
veried.
5.1 Merge
In this example, a merge algorithm is implemented. As shown in listing 5.2, the
method merges two sorted segments of array a, to one sorted segment. The rst
segment is from index left to right-1 and the second one is from index right to end.
The precondition declares that these sublists are sorted and request write permission
on the array from element left to end. The method combines these sublists to one
sorted list from left to end in array b. The while statement is annotated with loop
invariants. The invariants declare the range of used indices. Also, it is declared that
b is sorted. Finally, the sorted array b is copied in array a. The method asserts that
the array is sorted from left to end and then loses permission on these locations.
(class M
(in length : int32, obj a, b : real[length])
pre a != b
pre 0 < length
proc merge(in left : int32, in right : int32, in end : int32)
pre 0 _< left /\ left < right /\ right _< end /\ end < Length(a)
takes { i : {left,..,end} . a(i)}
takes { i : {left,..,end} . b(i)}
pre (forall i, j : left _< i /\ i < j /\ j < right . a[i] _< a[j])
pre (forall i, j : right _< i /\ i < j /\ j _< end . a[i] _< a[j])
post (forall i, j : left _< i /\ i < j /\ j _< end . a[i] _< a[j])
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gives { i : {left,..,end} . a(i)}
gives { i : {left,..,end} . b(i)}
(thread (t0)
(accept merge(in left : int32, in right : int32, in end : int32)
obj ileft : int32 := left
obj iright : int32 := right
obj k : int32 := left
(while (left _< k /\ k _< end)
invariant acc left@0.5, right@0.5, end@0.5, k, ileft, iright,
{i:{left,..,end} . a[i]}, {i:{left,..,end} . b[i]}
invariant (left _< k /\ k _< end+1)
invariant (left _< ileft /\ ileft _< right)
invariant (right _< iright /\ iright _< end+1)
invariant (forall i, j : (left _< i /\ i < k /\ ileft _< j /\ j  -
,!< right). b[i] _< a[j])
invariant (forall i, j : (left _< i /\ i < k /\ iright _< j /\ j  -
,!_< end) . b[i] _< a[j])
invariant (forall i, j : (left _< i /\ i _< j /\ j < k) . b[i] _ -
,!< b[j]);
(if (ileft < right /\ iright _< end /\ k _< end)
(if (a[ileft] _< a[iright])
b[k] := a[ileft];
ileft := ileft + 1
(else
b[k] := a[iright]
iright := iright + 1
)
if)
k := k + 1
(else if (ileft = right /\ iright _< end /\ k _< end)
b[k] := a[iright]
iright := iright + 1
k := k + 1
)
(else if (iright = end+1 /\ ileft < right /\ k _< end)
b[k] := a[ileft]
ileft := ileft + 1
k := k + 1
)
if)
while)
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k := left
(while (left _< k /\ k _< end)
invariant acc left@0.5, end@0.5, k,
{i:{left,..,end} . a[i]}, {i:{left,..,end} . b[i]}
invariant (left _< k /\ k _< end+1)
invariant (forall i : (left _< i /\ i < k) ==> a[i] = b[i]);
a[k] := b[k]
k := k + 1
while)
accept)
thread)
class)
Listing 5.2: Merge code
The translation of the merge method is provided in listing 5.3. It veries that
array a is sorted from left to end.
type Ref;
type Field x;
type HeapType = <x>[Ref, Field x]x;
var Heap : HeapType;
type ArrayRef x;
type ArrayHeapType = <x>[ArrayRef x, int] x;
var ArrayHeap : ArrayHeapType;
type Perm = real;
type PermissionType = <x>[Ref, Field x] Perm;
type ArrayPermissionType = <x>[ArrayRef x, int] Perm;
var LockPermission : PermissionType;
var ArrayLockPermission : ArrayPermissionType;
function Length<x>(Field (ArrayRef x)) returns(int);
axiom 0 < Length(M.a);
axiom 0 < Length(M.b);
axiom Length(M.a) == Length(M.b);
type ClassName;
function dtype(Ref) returns(ClassName);
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const unique M : ClassName;
const unique M.left : Field int;
const unique M.right : Field int;
const unique M.end : Field int;
const unique M.size : Field int;
const unique M.ileft : Field int;
const unique M.iright : Field int;
const unique M.k : Field int;
const unique M.a: Field (ArrayRef int);
const unique M.b: Field (ArrayRef int);
procedure t0(this:Ref)
modies Heap, ArrayHeap;
requires Heap[this, M.a] != Heap[this, M.b];
{
var Permission, oldPermission, prePermission : PermissionType;
var ArrayPermission, oldArrayPermission, preArrayPermission :  -
,!ArrayPermissionType;
var oldHeap, preHeap, tmp_Heap : HeapType;
var oldArrayHeap, preArrayHeap, tmp_ArrayHeap : ArrayHeapType;
havoc Permission;
assume (forall<x> o:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[o, f] == 0.0);
havoc ArrayPermission;
assume (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: ArrayPermission[o, f] == 0.0);
prePermission := Permission;
preArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
while(true)
invariant Heap[this, M.a] != Heap[this, M.b];
invariant (forall<x> o:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[o, f] == prePermission[o,  -
,!f]);
invariant (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: ArrayPermission[o, f] ==  -
,!preArrayPermission[o, f]);
{
//merge
goto Merge;
Merge:
//permission on parameters
havoc tmp_Heap;
Heap[this, M.left] := tmp_Heap[this, M.left];
Permission[this, M.left] := Permission[this, M.left] + 0.5;
havoc tmp_Heap;
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Heap[this, M.right] := tmp_Heap[this, M.right];
Permission[this, M.right] := Permission[this, M.right] + 0.5;
havoc tmp_Heap;
Heap[this, M.end] := tmp_Heap[this, M.end];
Permission[this, M.end] := Permission[this, M.end] + 0.5;
//pre 0 <= left && left < right && right <= M.end && M.end <  -
,!a.Length
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume (0 <= Heap[this, M.left] && Heap[this, M.left] < Heap[this, M.right -
,!] && Heap[this, M.right] <= Heap[this, M.end] &&
Heap[this, M.end] < Length(M.a));
assume (forall<x> o:Ref, f : Field x :: !((o == this && f == M.left) || (o  -
,!== this && f == M.right) || (o == this && f == M.end)) ==>
Heap[o, f]==oldHeap[o, f]);
//takes { i : {left,..M.end} . a(i) }
oldArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
havoc ArrayPermission;
assume (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (o == Heap[this, M.a]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == oldArrayPermission[o,f] + 1.0);
assume (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !((o == Heap[this, M.a]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end]))==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == oldArrayPermission[o,f]);
//takes { i : {left,..M.end} . b(i) }
oldArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
havoc ArrayPermission;
assume (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (o == Heap[this, M.b]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == oldArrayPermission[o,f] + 1.0);
assume (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !((o == Heap[this, M.b]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end]))==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == oldArrayPermission[o,f]);
//sorted a(left,..right) and a(right,..M.end)
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.left] && 0.0 < Permission[this, M.right] &&  -
,!0.0 < Permission[this, M.end];
oldArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
havoc ArrayHeap;
assume (forall i : int, j:int :: (Heap[this, M.left] <= i && i < j && j <  -
,!Heap[this, M.right]) ==>
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a], i] <= ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a], j]);
assume (forall i : int, j:int :: (Heap[this, M.right] <= i && i < j && j <= -
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,! Heap[this, M.end]) ==>
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a], i] <= ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a], j]);
assume (forall<x> i : int, t:ArrayRef x :: !(t==Heap[this, M.a] && (Heap[ -
,!this, M.left] <= i && i <= Heap[this, M.end])) ==>
ArrayHeap[t, i] == oldArrayHeap[t, i]);
//body
preHeap := Heap;
preArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
//local variables
Permission[this, M.ileft] := Permission[this, M.ileft] + 1.0;
assert Permission[this, M.left] > 0.0;
Heap[this, M.ileft] := Heap[this, M.left];
Permission[this, M.iright] := Permission[this, M.iright] + 1.0;
assert Permission[this, M.right] > 0.0;
Heap[this, M.iright] := Heap[this, M.right];
Permission[this, M.k] := Permission[this, M.k] + 1.0;
assert Permission[this, M.left] > 0.0;
Heap[this, M.k] := Heap[this, M.left];
oldPermission := Permission;
oldArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
oldArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
oldHeap := Heap;
while (Heap[this, M.left] <= Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.k] <= Heap[ -
,!this, M.end])
invariant Permission[this, M.left] == 0.5 && Permission[this, M.right] ==  -
,!0.5 && Permission[this, M.end] == 0.5 &&
Permission[this, M.k] == 1.0 && Permission[this, M.ileft] == 1.0  -
,!&& Permission[this, M.iright] == 1.0 &&
(forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (o == Heap[this, M.a]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == 1.0) &&
(forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (o == Heap[this, M.b]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == 1.0);
invariant (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == M.left) &&  -
,!!(r==this && f == M.right) &&
!(r==this && f == M.end) && !(r==this && f == M.ileft)  -
,!&& !(r==this && f == M.iright) && !(r==this && f == M.k) )
==> Permission[r, f] == oldPermission[r, f]);
invariant (forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !(((r == Heap[this, M.a])||(r  -
,!== Heap[this, M.b])) && (Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])) -
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,!==>
ArrayPermission[r,f] == oldArrayPermission[r,f]);
invariant (Heap[this, M.left] <= Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.k] -
,! <= Heap[this, M.end]+1);
invariant (Heap[this, M.left] <= Heap[this, M.ileft] && Heap[this,  -
,!M.ileft] <= Heap[this, M.right]);
invariant (Heap[this, M.right] <= Heap[this, M.iright] && Heap[this, -
,! M.iright] <= Heap[this, M.end]+1);
invariant (forall<x> o:Ref, f : Field x :: (!((o == this && f ==  -
,!M.ileft) || (o == this && f == M.iright)|| (o == this && f == M.k))) ==>
Heap[o, f]==oldHeap[o, f]);
invariant (forall i : int, j : int :: (Heap[this, M.left] <= i && i <  -
,!Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.ileft] <= j && j < Heap[this, M.right]) ==>
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b],i] <= ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a],j]);
invariant (forall i : int, j : int :: (Heap[this, M.left] <= i && i <  -
,!Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.iright] <= j && j <= Heap[this, M.end]) ==>
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b],i] <= ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a],j]);
invariant (forall<x> i, j: int, t:ArrayRef x :: (t == Heap[this, M.b]  -
,!&& (Heap[this, M.left] <= i && i < j && j < Heap[this, M.k])) ==>
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b], i] <= ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b], j]);
invariant (forall<x> i:int, t:ArrayRef x :: (t !=Heap[this, M.b] || !( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= i && i < Heap[this, M.k]))==>
ArrayHeap[t,i] == oldArrayHeap[t,i]);
{
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.left] && 0.0 < Permission[this, M.right]  -
,!&& 0.0 < Permission[this, M.end] &&
0.0 < Permission[this, M.ileft] && 0.0 < Permission[this, M.iright]  -
,!&& 0.0 < Permission[this, M.k];
if (Heap[this, M.ileft] < Heap[this, M.right] &&
Heap[this, M.iright] <= Heap[this, M.end] &&
Heap[this, M.k] <= Heap[this, M.end])
{
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.ileft] && 0.0 < Permission[this,  -
,!M.iright] &&
0.0 < ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.ileft]]  -
,!&&
0.0 < ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.iright]];
if (ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.ileft]] <= ArrayHeap[ -
,!Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.iright]])
{
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.k] && 0.0 < Permission[this,  -
,!M.ileft] &&
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0.0 < ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.ileft]]  -
,!&&
ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.b], Heap[this, M.k]] == 1.0  -
,!&&
0 <= Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.k] < Length(M.b);
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b], Heap[this, M.k]] := ArrayHeap[Heap[ -
,!this, M.a], Heap[this, M.ileft]];
assert Permission[this, M.ileft] == 1.0;
Heap[this, M.ileft] := Heap[this, M.ileft] + 1;
}
else
{
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.k] && 0.0 < Permission[this,  -
,!M.iright] &&
0.0 < ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.iright -
,!]]&&
ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.b], Heap[this, M.k]] == 1.0;
assert 0 <= Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.k] < Length(M.b);
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b], Heap[this, M.k]] := ArrayHeap[Heap[ -
,!this, M.a], Heap[this, M.iright]];
assert Permission[this, M.iright] == 1.0;
Heap[this, M.iright] := Heap[this, M.iright] + 1;
}
assert Permission[this, M.k] == 1.0;
Heap[this, M.k] := Heap[this, M.k] + 1;
}
else if (Heap[this, M.ileft] == Heap[this, M.right] &&
Heap[this, M.iright] <= Heap[this, M.end] &&
Heap[this, M.k] <= Heap[this, M.end])
{
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.k] && 0.0 < Permission[this, M.iright] -
,! &&
0.0 < ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.iright]] &&
ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.b], Heap[this, M.k]] == 1.0;
assert 0 <= Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.k] < Length(M.b);
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b], Heap[this, M.k]] := ArrayHeap[Heap[this,  -
,!M.a], Heap[this, M.iright]];
assert Permission[this, M.iright] == 1.0;
Heap[this, M.iright] := Heap[this, M.iright] + 1;
assert Permission[this, M.k] == 1.0;
Heap[this, M.k] := Heap[this, M.k] + 1;
}
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else if ((Heap[this, M.iright] == Heap[this, M.end]+1) &&
Heap[this, M.ileft] < Heap[this, M.right] &&
Heap[this, M.k] <= Heap[this, M.end])
{
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.k] && 0.0 < Permission[this, M.ileft]  -
,!&&
0.0 < ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.ileft]] &&
ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.b], Heap[this, M.k]] == 1.0;
assert 0 <= Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.k] < Length(M.b);
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b], Heap[this, M.k]] := ArrayHeap[Heap[this,  -
,!M.a], Heap[this, M.ileft]];
assert Permission[this, M.ileft] == 1.0;
Heap[this, M.ileft] := Heap[this, M.ileft] + 1;
assert Permission[this, M.k] == 1.0;
Heap[this, M.k] := Heap[this, M.k] + 1;
}
}
assert Permission[this, M.k] == 1.0 && 0.0 < Permission[this, M.left];
Heap[this, M.k] := Heap[this, M.left];
assert ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.k]] == 1.0;
oldArrayHeap := ArrayHeap;
oldHeap := Heap;
oldPermission := Permission;
oldArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.left] && 0.0 < Permission[this, M.k] && 0.0  -
,!< Permission[this, M.end];
while ((Heap[this, M.left] <= Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.k] <= Heap[ -
,!this, M.end]))
invariant Permission[this, M.left] == 0.5 && Permission[this, M.end] == 0 -
,!.5 && Permission[this, M.k] == 1.0 &&
(forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (o == Heap[this, M.a]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == 1.0) &&
(forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (o == Heap[this, M.b]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == 1.0);
invariant (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == M.left) && !( -
,!r==this && f == M.k) && !(r==this && f == M.end))
==> Permission[r, f] == oldPermission[r, f]);
invariant (forall<x> r:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !(((r == Heap[this, M.a])||(r  -
,!== Heap[this, M.b])) && (Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])) -
112
,!==>
ArrayPermission[r,f] == oldArrayPermission[r,f]);
invariant (Heap[this, M.left] <= Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.k]  -
,!<= Heap[this, M.end]+1);
invariant (forall<x> o:Ref, f : Field x :: !(o == this && f == M.k)  -
,!==> Heap[o, f] == oldHeap[o, f]);
invariant (forall i : int :: (Heap[this, M.left] <= i && i < Heap[this,  -
,!M.k]) ==> ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a], i] == ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b], i]);
invariant (forall<x> i : int , t : ArrayRef x :: !(t ==Heap[this, M.a]  -
,!&& (Heap[this, M.left] <= i && i < Heap[this, M.k])) ==>
ArrayHeap[t,i] == oldArrayHeap[t,i]);
{
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.k] &&
ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.k]] == 1.0 &&
ArrayPermission[Heap[this, M.b], Heap[this, M.k]] == 1.0 &&
(0 <= Heap[this, M.k] && Heap[this, M.k] < Length(M.a));
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a], Heap[this, M.k]] := ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.b -
,!], Heap[this, M.k]];
assert Permission[this, M.k] == 1.0;
Heap[this, M.k] := Heap[this, M.k] + 1;
}
//postcondition
assert 0.0 < Permission[this, M.left] && 0.0 < Permission[this, M.end];
assert (forall i, j: int :: (Heap[this, M.left] <= i && i < j && j <= Heap[ -
,!this, M.end]) ==>
ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a],i] <= ArrayHeap[Heap[this, M.a],j]);
//permission
//local variables
assert Permission[this, M.ileft] == 1.0;
Permission[this, M.ileft] := Permission[this, M.ileft]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, M.iright] == 1.0;
Permission[this, M.iright] := Permission[this, M.iright]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, M.k] == 1.0;
Permission[this, M.k] := Permission[this, M.k]   1.0;
//takes { i : {left,..M.end} . a(i) }
oldArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
havoc ArrayPermission;
assume (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (o == Heap[this, M.a]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == oldArrayPermission[o,f]   1.0);
assume (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !((o == Heap[this, M.a]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end]))==>
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ArrayPermission[o,f] == oldArrayPermission[o,f]);
//takes { i : {left,..M.end} . b(i) }
oldArrayPermission := ArrayPermission;
havoc ArrayPermission;
assume (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: (o == Heap[this, M.b]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end])==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == oldArrayPermission[o,f]   1.0);
assume (forall<x> o:ArrayRef x, f : int :: !((o == Heap[this, M.b]) && ( -
,!Heap[this, M.left] <= f && f <= Heap[this, M.end]))==>
ArrayPermission[o,f] == oldArrayPermission[o,f]);
//parameters
assert Permission[this, M.left] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, M.left] := Permission[this, M.left]   0.5;
assert Permission[this, M.right] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, M.right] := Permission[this, M.right]   0.5;
assert Permission[this, M.end] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, M.end] := Permission[this, M.end]   0.5;
goto Done;
Done:
}
}
Listing 5.3: Translation of merge code in Boogie
This program veries successfuly. Additionally, two tests with incorrect code and
incorrect specication are performed as follows:
 Erroneous Code
For instance, we change the code "b[k] := a[ileft];" to "b[k] := a[iright];" in the
rst if statement. This causes the invariant "(forall i, j : (left _< i /n i < k /n ileft
_< j /n j < right). b[i] _< a[j])" not to be maintained and the following error is
given:
Error BP5005: This loop invariant might not be maintained by the loop.
 Erroneous Specication
114
For this case, we remove the specication "takes {i : {left,..,end} . b(i)}" from
the contracts of the method. This makes accessing to the locations of array b wrong
and the following error is shown in the lines accessing to the array b:
Error BP5001: This assertion might not hold.
5.2 Permission Transfer Scenarios
In this section, the three scenarios of permission transfer presented in section 3.6 are
translated and veried. The most critical issues are that permissions are not lost
and the threads can transfer permissions. The programs are tested in three points.
First, thread t0_client must have full permission on the eld a and no permission on
the ghost elds of two servers in the end of the thread; this is marked with test A.
Second, both servers must have zero permission on eld a in the end, and must have
full permission on their ghost elds; these testings are marked by test B and test C
in the translation. The complete translation of these scenraios to Boogie are added
in Appendix A.0.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Formal verication is the act of checking the correctness of programs with formal
methods of mathematics. Many approaches have been developed to verify programs.
In this thesis, we used the implicit dynamic frames methodology [7] with fractional
permissions [8], which permits verication of concurrent programs. Implicit dynamic
frames were developed as a variant of dynamic frames [9] with access assertions on
precondition and postcondtions. This methodology is based on verication condi-
tion generation and automated theorem proving. Implicit dynamic frames was rst
implemented in Vericool [15]. The Chalice program verier [19] extended this ap-
proach with a mixture of fractional permissions and innitesimal permissions which
are similar to counting permissions.
Fractional permissions were introduced by Boyland [8], who used them to check
inference in a concurrent typed system. Zhao [25] implemented fractional permissions
in a typed system for concurrent Java programs. However, Zhaos work does not sup-
port verifying programs with programmer-provided specication. Verifying programs
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with permissions was rst explored in Separation logic by Bornat et al. [26], Gotsman
et al. [27], and Hobor et al. [28].
6.0 Contribution
In this thesis, we present a verication methodology for the multi-threaded and
object-oriented Harpo/L programming language. Our methodology allows verify-
ing programs based on their contracts. More importantly, it rules out data races.
Also, it supports object invariants, rendezvous and ne-grained concurrency. This
methodology is built based on implicit dynamic frames with fractional permissions.
An expressive and exible specication language is developed based on this method-
ology. It also permits modular specication and verication.
We have provided the encoding of HARPO/L constructs to an intermediate ver-
ication language, Boogie, based on our methodology. Several test cases are imple-
mented with this approach. Also, we have specied and successfully veried some
challenging algorithms as illustrated in this thesis.
6.1 Future Work
This thesis is developed based on language design 8 of HARPO/L [6]. In future,
when adding new features to the language, their verication must be considered too.
In the time of this thesis, the compiler of HARPO/L was not ready; therefore one
future step is to implement the developed approach in a tool. Another direction for
future research is to develop the methodology to allow verication that systems do
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not deadlock. All properties veried so far are safety properties and another direction
for future work is to verify liveness properties as well.
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Appendix A
An Appendix
A.0 Translation of Permission Transfer Scenarios
 Scenario 1
The code and specication of this scenario is presented in listing 3.3. The trans-
lation of the code in Boogie is shown below:
type Ref;
type Field x;
type HeapType = <x>[Ref, Field x]x;
var Heap : HeapType;
type Perm = real;
type PermissionType = <x>[Ref, Field x] Perm;
var LockPermission : PermissionType;
type ClassName;
function dtype(Ref) returns(ClassName);
const unique C : ClassName;
const unique C.a : Field bool;
const unique C.gp1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.gp2 : Field Perm;
const unique C.p1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.p2 : Field Perm;
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const unique C.p1_init : Field Perm;
const unique C.p2_init : Field Perm;
const unique C.pc1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.pc2 : Field Perm;
procedure C.C(this:Ref)
requires dtype(this) <: C;
modies Heap;
modies LockPermission;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap : HeapType;
havoc Heap;
//check claims
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + 1.0;
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 1.0;
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2] + 1.0;
assert (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] <= 1.0);
//initialize
Heap[this, C.a] := false;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := 0.0;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := 0.0;
}
procedure C.t0_client(this : Ref)
modies Heap;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, preHeap, Heap_tmp : HeapType;
var p1, p1_init : Perm;
var that : Ref;
//claim
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + 1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.a] == false;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.a) ==> Heap[r, f -
,!] == oldHeap[r, f]);
while(true)
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invariant Permission[this, C.a] == 1.0;
{
//thread body
Permission[this, C.pc1] := Permission[this, C.pc1] + 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.pc1] := 0.5;
//     call worker1_start
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] > 0.0;
p1 := Heap[this, C.pc1];
that := this;
//precondition
assert p1 > 0.0 && p1 < 1.0;
assert Permission[that, C.a] >= p1;
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a]   p1;
//postcondition
if (Permission[that, C.gp1] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.gp1] := Heap_tmp[that, C.gp1];
}
Permission[that, C.gp1] := Permission[that, C.gp1] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[that, C.gp1] == p1;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==that && f == C.gp1) ==>  -
,!Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//     call worker1_nish
preHeap := Heap;
that := this;
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] > 0.0;
p1_init := Heap[this, C.pc1];
//precondition
assert p1_init == Heap[that, C.gp1];
assert Permission[that, C.gp1] >= 0.5;
Permission[that, C.gp1] := Permission[that, C.gp1]   0.5;
//postcondition
if (Permission[that, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.a] := Heap_tmp[that, C.a];
}
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Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a] + p1_init;
//test A
assert Permission[this, C.a] == 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0;
//lose local permission
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.pc1] := Permission[this, C.pc1]   1.0;
}
}
procedure C.t1_server1(this : Ref)
modies Heap;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, Heap_tmp, preHeap : HeapType;
var p2, p2_init : Perm;
var that : Ref;
//claim
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.gp1] == 0.0;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.gp1) ==> Heap[r -
,!, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
while(true)
invariant Permission[this, C.gp1] == 1.0;
{
//     worker1_start
goto worker1_start;
worker1_start:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p1] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p1] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p1];
}
Permission[this, C.p1] := Permission[this, C.p1] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
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assume Heap[this, C.p1] > 0.0 && Heap[this, C.p1] < 1.0;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.p1) ==>  -
,!Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
if (Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.a] := Heap_tmp[this, C.a];
}
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + Heap[this, C.p1];
//body
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.p1] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := Heap[this, C.p1];
//postcondition
assert Heap[this, C.gp1] == preHeap[this, C.p1];
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1]   0.5;
Permission[this, C.p1] := Permission[this, C.p1]   0.5;
goto Done_worker1_start;
Done_worker1_start:
//thread code
Permission[this, C.pc2] := Permission[this, C.pc2] + 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] == 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.pc2] := Heap[this, C.gp1] / 2;
//     call worker2_start
oldHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] > 0.0;
p2 := Heap[this, C.pc2];
that := this;
//precondition
assert p2 > 0.0 && p2 < 1.0;
assert Permission[that, C.a] >= p2;
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a]   p2;
//postcondition
if (Permission[that, C.gp2] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.gp2] := Heap_tmp[that, C.gp2];
}
Permission[that, C.gp2] := Permission[that, C.gp2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
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havoc Heap;
assume Heap[that, C.gp2] == p2;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==that && f == C.gp2) ==>  -
,!Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//     call worker2_nish
oldHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] > 0.0;
p2_init := Heap[this, C.pc2];
that := this;
//precondition
assert p2_init == Heap[that, C.gp2];
Permission[that, C.gp2] := Permission[that, C.gp2]   0.5;
//postcondition
if (Permission[that, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.a] := Heap_tmp[that, C.a];
}
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a] + p2_init;
//     worker1_nish
goto worker1_nish;
worker1_nish:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p1_init] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p1_init] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p1_init];
}
Permission[this, C.p1_init] := Permission[this, C.p1_init] + 0.5;
if (Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := Heap_tmp[this, C.gp1];
}
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p1_init] == Heap[this, C.gp1];
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.p1_init)  -
,!==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//body
preHeap := Heap;
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//post
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a]   Heap[this, C.p1_init];
Permission[this, C.p1_init] := Permission[this, C.p1_init]   0.5;
goto Done_worker1_nish;
Done_worker1_nish:
//test B
assert Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0;
//lose permission on locals
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.pc2] := Permission[this, C.pc2]   1.0;
}
}
procedure C.t2_server2(this : Ref)
modies Heap;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, Heap_tmp, preHeap : HeapType;
var oldPermission : PermissionType;
//claim gp2@1.0
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2] + 1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.gp2] == 0.0;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.gp2) ==> Heap[r -
,!, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
while(true)
invariant Permission[this, C.gp2] == 1.0;
{
//     worker2_start
goto worker2_start;
worker2_start:
//pre
if (Permission[this, C.p2] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p2] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p2];
}
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Permission[this, C.p2] := Permission[this, C.p2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume 0.0 < Heap[this, C.p2] && Heap[this, C.p2] < 1.0;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.p2) ==>  -
,!Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
if (Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.a] := Heap_tmp[this, C.a];
}
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + Heap[this, C.p2];
//body
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.p2] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := Heap[this, C.p2];
//postcondition
assert Heap[this, C.gp2] == preHeap[this, C.p2];
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2]   0.5;
Permission[this, C.p2] := Permission[this, C.p2]   0.5;
goto Done_worker2_start;
Done_worker2_start:
//       worker2_nish
goto worker2_nish;
worker2_nish:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p2_init] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p2_init] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p2_init];
}
Permission[this, C.p2_init] := Permission[this, C.p2_init] + 0.5;
if (Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := Heap_tmp[this, C.gp2];
}
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p2_init] == Heap[this, C.gp2];
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assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.p2_init)  -
,!==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//body
preHeap := Heap;
//post
assert Permission[this, C.a] >= Heap[this, C.p2_init];
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a]   Heap[this, C.p2_init];
assert Permission[this, C.p2_init] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.p2_init] := Permission[this, C.p2_init]   0.5;
goto Done_worker2_nish;
Done_worker2_nish:
//test C
assert Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 1.0;
}
}
Listing A.0: Translation of scenario 1 in Boogie
 Scenario 2
The code and specication of this scenario is presented in listing 3.4. The trans-
lation of the code in Boogie is shown below:
type Ref;
type Field x;
type HeapType = <x>[Ref, Field x]x;
var Heap : HeapType;
type Perm = real;
type PermissionType = <x>[Ref, Field x] Perm;
var LockPermission : PermissionType;
type ClassName;
function dtype(Ref) returns(ClassName);
const unique C : ClassName;
const unique C.a : Field bool;
const unique C.gp1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.gp2 : Field Perm;
const unique C.p1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.p2 : Field Perm;
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const unique C.p1_init : Field Perm;
const unique C.p2_init : Field Perm;
const unique C.po1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.po2 : Field Perm;
const unique C.p : Field Perm;
const unique C.pc1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.pc2 : Field Perm;
procedure C.C(this:Ref)
requires dtype(this) <: C;
modies Heap;
modies LockPermission;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap : HeapType;
havoc Heap;
//check claims
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + 1.0;
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 1.0;
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2] + 1.0;
assert (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] <= 1.0);
//initialize
Heap[this, C.a] := false;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := 0.0;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := 0.0;
}
procedure C.t0_client(this : Ref)
modies Heap;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, preHeap, preHeap0, Heap_tmp : HeapType;
var that : Ref;
var p1, p1_init, po1 : Perm;
var p2, p2_init, po2 : Perm;
//claim
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + 1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
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assume Heap[this, C.a] == false;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == C.a)) ==> Heap[r,  -
,!f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
while(true)
invariant Permission[this, C.a] == 1.0;
{
//main
preHeap0 := Heap;
//permission on local variables
Permission[this, C.p] := Permission[this, C.p] + 1.0;
Heap[this, C.p] := 0.0;
Permission[this, C.pc1] := Permission[this, C.pc1] + 1.0;
Heap[this, C.pc1] := 0.0;
Permission[this, C.po1] := Permission[this, C.po1] + 1.0;
Heap[this, C.po1] := 0.0;
Permission[this, C.po2] := Permission[this, C.po2] + 1.0;
Heap[this, C.po2] := 0.0;
//code
assert Permission[this, C.p] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.p] := 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] == 1.0 && Permission[this, C.p] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.pc1] := Heap[this, C.p] / 2;
assert Permission[this, C.p] == 1.0 && Permission[this, C.pc1] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.p] := Heap[this, C.p]   Heap[this, C.pc1];
//     call worker1_start
preHeap := Heap;
that := this;
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] > 0.0;
p1 := Heap[this, C.pc1];
//precondition
assert p1 > 0.0 && p1 < 1.0;
assert Permission[that, C.a] >= p1;
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a]   p1;
//postcondition
if (Permission[that, C.gp1] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.gp1] := Heap_tmp[that, C.gp1];
}
Permission[that, C.gp1] := Permission[that, C.gp1] + 0.5;
if (Permission[that, C.gp2] == 0.0)
{
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havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.gp2] := Heap_tmp[that, C.gp2];
}
Permission[that, C.gp2] := Permission[that, C.gp2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[that, C.gp1] == p1;
assume Heap[that, C.gp2] == p1 / 2;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !((r==that && f == C.gp1) || (r== -
,!that && f == C.gp1)) ==>
Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//     call worker1_nish
preHeap := Heap;
that := this;
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] > 0.0;
p1_init := Heap[this, C.pc1];
//precondition
assert p1_init == Heap[that, C.gp1];
assert Permission[that, C.gp1] >= 0.5;
Permission[that, C.gp1] := Permission[that, C.gp1]   0.5;
//postcondition
havoc po1;
assume po1 == p1_init / 2;
if (Permission[that, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.a] := Heap_tmp[that, C.a];
}
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a] + po1;
assert Permission[this, C.po1] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.po1] := po1;
//p := p + pr1
assert Permission[this, C.po1] > 0.0 && Permission[this, C.p] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.p] := Heap[this, C.p] + Heap[this, C.po1];
//     call worker2_nish
preHeap := Heap;
that := this;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.po2] == 1.0;
p2_init := Heap[this, C.gp2];
//precondition
assert p2_init == Heap[that, C.gp2];
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assert Permission[that, C.gp2] >= 0.5;
Permission[that, C.gp2] := Permission[that, C.gp2]   0.5;
//postcondition
havoc po2;
assume po2 == p2_init;
if (Permission[that, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.a] := Heap_tmp[this, C.a];
}
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a] + po2;
assert Permission[this, C.po2] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.po2] := po2;
//test A
assert Permission[this, C.a] == 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0;
//lose permission on local variables
assert Permission[this, C.p] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.p] := Permission[this, C.p]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.pc1] := Permission[this, C.pc1]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.po1] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.po1] := Permission[this, C.po1]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.po2] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.po2] := Permission[this, C.po2]   1.0;
}
}
procedure C.t1_server1(this : Ref)
modies Heap;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, oldHeap2, preHeap, Heap_tmp : HeapType;
var that : Ref;
var p2, p2_init : Perm;
//claim
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
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assume Heap[this, C.gp1] == 0.0;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.gp1) ==> Heap[r -
,!, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
while (true)
invariant Permission[this, C.gp1] == 1.0;
{
//     worker1_start
goto worker1_start;
worker1_start:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p1] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p1] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p1];
}
Permission[this, C.p1] := Permission[this, C.p1] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p1] > 0.0 && Heap[this, C.p1] < 1.0;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == C.p1)) ==>  -
,!Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
if (Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.a] := Heap_tmp[this, C.a];
}
assert Permission[this, C.p1] > 0.0;
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + Heap[this, C.p1];
//body
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.p1] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := Heap[this, C.p1];
Permission[this, C.pc2] := Permission[this, C.pc2] + 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] == 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.pc2] := Heap[this, C.gp1] / 2;
//     call worker2_start
oldHeap2 := Heap;
that := this;
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] > 0.0;
p2 := Heap[this, C.pc2];
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//precondition call worker2_start
assert p2 > 0.0 && p2 < 1.0;
assert Permission[that, C.a] >= p2;
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a]   p2;
//postcondition call worker2_start
if (Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := Heap_tmp[this, C.gp2];
}
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[that, C.gp2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[that, C.gp2] == p2;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==that && f == C.gp2)) ==>  -
,!Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//postcondition worker1_start
assert Heap[this, C.gp1] == Heap[this, C.p1];
assert Heap[this, C.gp2] == Heap[this, C.p1]/2;
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2]   0.5;
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1]   0.5;
Permission[this, C.p1] := Permission[this, C.p1]   0.5;
goto Done_worker1_start;
Done_worker1_start:
//     worker1_nish
goto worker1_nish;
worker1_nish:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p1_init] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p1_init] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p1_init];
}
Permission[this, C.p1_init] := Permission[this, C.p1_init] + 0.5;
if (Permission[this, C.po1] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.po1] := Heap_tmp[this, C.po1];
}
Permission[this, C.po1] := Permission[this, C.po1] + 1.0;
if (Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0)
{
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havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := Heap_tmp[this, C.gp1];
}
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p1_init] == Heap[this, C.gp1];
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == C.p1_init))  -
,!==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//body
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.po1] == 1.0 && Permission[this, C.p1_init] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.po1] := Heap[this, C.gp1] / 2;
//post
assert Heap[this, C.po1] == preHeap[this, C.p1_init] / 2;
assert Permission[this, C.a] >= Heap[this, C.po1];
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a]   Heap[this, C.po1];
assert Permission[this, C.po1] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.po1] := Permission[this, C.po1]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.p1_init] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.p1_init] := Permission[this, C.p1_init]   0.5;
goto Done_worker1_nish;
Done_worker1_nish:
//test B
assert Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0;
}
}
procedure C.t2_server2(this : Ref)
modies Heap;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, Heap_tmp, preHeap : HeapType;
//claim
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2] + 1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.gp2] == 0.0;
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assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.gp2) ==> Heap[r -
,!, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
while(true)
invariant Permission[this, C.gp2] == 1.0;
{
//     worker2_start
goto worker2_start;
worker2_start:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p2] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p2] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p2];
}
Permission[this, C.p2] := Permission[this, C.p2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p2] > 0.0 && Heap[this, C.p2] < 1.0;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == C.p2)) ==>  -
,!Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
if (Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.a] := Heap_tmp[this, C.a];
}
assert Permission[this, C.p2] > 0.0;
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + Heap[this, C.p2];
//body
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.p2] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := Heap[this, C.p2];
//postcondition
assert Heap[this, C.gp2] == preHeap[this, C.p2];
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2]   0.5;
assert Permission[this, C.p2] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.p2] := Permission[this, C.p2]   0.5;
goto Done_worker2_start;
Done_worker2_start:
//     worker2_nish
goto worker2_nish;
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worker2_nish:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p2_init] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p2_init] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p2_init];
}
Permission[this, C.p2_init] := Permission[this, C.p2_init] + 0.5;
if (Permission[this, C.po2] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.po2] := Heap_tmp[this, C.po2];
}
Permission[this, C.po2] := Permission[this, C.po2] + 1.0;
if (Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := Heap_tmp[this, C.gp2];
}
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p2_init] == Heap[this, C.gp2];
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == C.p2_init))  -
,!==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//body
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.p2_init] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.po2] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.po2] := Heap[this, C.p2_init];
//post
assert Heap[this, C.po2] == preHeap[this, C.p2_init];
assert (Permission[this, C.a] >= Heap[this, C.po2]) && (Permission[this,  -
,!C.po2] > 0.0);
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a]   Heap[this, C.po2];
assert Permission[this, C.po2] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.po2] := Permission[this, C.po2]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.p2_init] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.p2_init] := Permission[this, C.p2_init]   0.5;
goto Done_worker2_nish;
Done_worker2_nish:
//test C
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assert Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 1.0;
}
}
Listing A.1: Translation of scenario 2 in Boogie
 Scenario 3
The code and specication of this scenario is presented in listing 3.5. The trans-
lation of the code in Boogie is shown below:
type Ref;
type Field x;
type HeapType = <x>[Ref, Field x]x;
var Heap : HeapType;
type Perm = real;
type PermissionType = <x>[Ref, Field x] Perm;
var LockPermission : PermissionType;
type ClassName;
function dtype(Ref) returns(ClassName);
const unique C : ClassName;
const unique C.a : Field bool;
const unique C.gp1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.gp2 : Field Perm;
const unique C.p1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.p2 : Field Perm;
const unique C.p1_init : Field Perm;
const unique C.p2_init : Field Perm;
const unique C.po : Field Perm;
const unique C.p : Field Perm;
const unique C.pc1 : Field Perm;
const unique C.pc2 : Field Perm;
const unique C.pr : Field Perm;
procedure C.C(this:Ref)
requires dtype(this) <: C;
modies Heap;
modies LockPermission;
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{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap : HeapType;
havoc Heap;
//check claims
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + 1.0;
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 1.0;
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2] + 1.0;
assert (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] <= 1.0);
//initialize
Heap[this, C.a] := false;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := 0.0;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := 0.0;
}
procedure C.t0_client(this : Ref)
modies Heap;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, oldHeap2, preHeap, preHeap0, Heap_tmp : HeapType;
var p1, p1_init, po : Perm;
var p2, p2_init : Perm;
var that : Ref;
//claim
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + 1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.a] == false;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.a) ==> Heap[r, f -
,!] == oldHeap[r, f]);
while (true)
invariant Permission[this, C.a] == 1.0;
{
//main
preHeap0 := Heap;
//local variables
Permission[this, C.p] := Permission[this, C.p] + 1.0;
Heap[this, C.p] := 1.0;
Permission[this, C.pc1] := Permission[this, C.pc1] + 1.0;
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Heap[this, C.pc1] := 0.0;
Permission[this, C.pc2] := Permission[this, C.pc2] + 1.0;
Heap[this, C.pc2] := 0.0;
Permission[this, C.po] := Permission[this, C.po] + 1.0;
Heap[this, C.po] := 0.0;
//code
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] == 1.0 && Permission[this, C.p] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.pc1] := Heap[this, C.p] / 2;
assert Permission[this, C.p] == 1.0 && Permission[this, C.pc1] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.p] := Heap[this, C.p]   Heap[this, C.pc1];
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] == 1.0 && Permission[this, C.p] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.pc2] := Heap[this, C.p] / 2;
assert Permission[this, C.p] == 1.0 && Permission[this, C.pc2] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.p] := Heap[this, C.p]   Heap[this, C.pc2];
//     call worker1_start
preHeap := Heap;
that := this;
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] > 0.0;
p1 := Heap[this, C.pc1];
//precondition
assert p1 > 0.0 && p1 < 1.0;
assert Permission[that, C.a] >= p1;
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a]   p1;
//postcondition
Permission[that, C.gp1] := Permission[that, C.gp1] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[that, C.gp1] == p1;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==that && f == C.gp1) ==>
Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//     call worker2_start
preHeap := Heap;
that := this;
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] > 0.0;
p2 := Heap[this, C.pc2];
//precondition
assert p2 > 0.0 && p2 < 1.0;
assert Permission[that, C.a] >= p2;
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a]   p2;
//postcondition
if (Permission[that, C.gp2] == 0.0)
{
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havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.gp2] := Heap_tmp[that, C.gp2];
}
Permission[that, C.gp2] := Permission[that, C.gp2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[that, C.gp2] == p2;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==that && f == C.gp2)) ==>
Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//     call worker2_nish
preHeap := Heap;
that := this;
assert Permission[this, C.pc1] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.po] == 1.0;
p1_init := Heap[this, C.pc1];
p2_init := Heap[this, C.pc2];
//precondition
assert p1_init == Heap[that, C.gp1];
assert p2_init == Heap[that, C.gp2];
assert Permission[that, C.gp1] >= 0.5;
Permission[that, C.gp1] := Permission[that, C.gp1]   0.5;
assert Permission[that, C.gp2] >= 0.5;
Permission[that, C.gp2] := Permission[that, C.gp2]   0.5;
//postcondition
havoc po;
assume po == p1_init + p2_init;
if (Permission[that, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.a] := Heap_tmp[that, C.a];
}
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a] + po;
assert Permission[this, C.po] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.po] := po;
//test A
assert Permission[this, C.a] == 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0;
//lose permission on local variables
assert Permission[this, C.p] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.p] := Permission[this, C.p]   1.0;
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assert Permission[this, C.pc1] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.pc1] := Permission[this, C.pc1]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.pc2] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.pc2] := Permission[this, C.pc2]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.po] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.po] := Permission[this, C.po]   1.0;
}
}
procedure C.t1_server1(this : Ref)
modies Heap;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, preHeap, Heap_tmp : HeapType;
//claim
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.gp1] == 0.0;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.gp1) ==> Heap[r -
,!, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
while (true)
invariant Permission[this, C.gp1] == 1.0;
{
//     worker1_start
goto worker1_start;
worker1_start:
//precondition worker1_start
if (Permission[this, C.p1] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p1] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p1];
}
Permission[this, C.p1] := Permission[this, C.p1] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p1] > 0.0 && Heap[this, C.p1] < 1.0;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == C.p1)) ==>  -
,!Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
if (Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0)
145
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.a] := Heap_tmp[this, C.a];
}
assert Permission[this, C.p1] > 0.0;
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + Heap[this, C.p1];
//body worker1_start
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.p1] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := Heap[this, C.p1];
//postcondition worker1_start
assert Heap[this, C.gp1] == preHeap[this, C.p1];
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1]   0.5;
assert Permission[this, C.p1] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.p1] := Permission[this, C.p1]   0.5;
goto Done_worker1_start;
Done_worker1_start:
//     worker1_nish
goto worker1_nish;
worker1_nish:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p1_init] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p1_init] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p1_init];
}
Permission[this, C.p1_init] := Permission[this, C.p1_init] + 0.5;
if (Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := Heap_tmp[this, C.gp1];
}
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p1_init] == Heap[this, C.gp1];
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == C.p1_init))  -
,!==> Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
//body worker1_nish
preHeap := Heap;
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//postcondition worker1_nish
assert Permission[this, C.a] >= Heap[this, C.p1_init];
assert Permission[this, C.p1_init] > 0.0;
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a]   Heap[this, C.p1_init];
assert Permission[this, C.p1_init] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.p1_init] := Permission[this, C.p1_init]   0.5;
goto Done_worker1_nish;
Done_worker1_nish:
//test B
assert Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0;
}
}
procedure C.t2_server2(this : Ref)
modies Heap;
requires dtype(this) <: C;
{
var Permission : PermissionType where
(forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: Permission[r, f] == 0.0);
var oldHeap, oldHeap2, Heap_tmp, preHeap, preHeap2 : HeapType;
var p1, p1_init : Perm;
var that : Ref;
//claim
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2] + 1.0;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.gp2] == 0.0;
assume (forall <x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: !(r==this && f == C.gp2) ==> Heap[r -
,!, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
while(true)
invariant Permission[this, C.gp2] == 1.0;
{
//     worker2_start
goto worker2_start;
worker2_start:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p2] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p2] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p2];
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}
Permission[this, C.p2] := Permission[this, C.p2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p2] > 0.0 && Heap[this, C.p2] < 1.0;
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!(r==this && f == C.p2)) ==>  -
,!Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]);
if (Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.a] := Heap_tmp[this, C.a];
}
assert Permission[this, C.p2] > 0.0;
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a] + Heap[this, C.p2];
//body
preHeap := Heap;
assert Permission[this, C.p2] > 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 1.0;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := Heap[this, C.p2];
//postcondition
assert Heap[this, C.gp2] == preHeap[this, C.p2];
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2]   0.5;
assert Permission[this, C.p2] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.p2] := Permission[this, C.p2]   0.5;
goto Done_worker2_start;
Done_worker2_start:
//     worker2_nish
goto worker2_nish;
worker2_nish:
//precondition
if (Permission[this, C.p1_init] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p1_init] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p1_init];
}
Permission[this, C.p1_init] := Permission[this, C.p1_init] + 0.5;
if (Permission[this, C.p2_init] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.p2_init] := Heap_tmp[this, C.p2_init];
}
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Permission[this, C.p2_init] := Permission[this, C.p2_init] + 0.5;
if (Permission[this, C.po] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.po] := Heap_tmp[this, C.po];
}
Permission[this, C.po] := Permission[this, C.po] + 1.0;
if (Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.gp1] := Heap_tmp[this, C.gp1];
}
Permission[this, C.gp1] := Permission[this, C.gp1] + 0.5;
if (Permission[this, C.gp2] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[this, C.gp2] := Heap_tmp[this, C.gp2];
}
Permission[this, C.gp2] := Permission[this, C.gp2] + 0.5;
oldHeap := Heap;
havoc Heap;
assume Heap[this, C.p2_init] == Heap[this, C.gp2];
assume Heap[this, C.p1_init] == Heap[this, C.gp1];
assume (forall<x> r:Ref, f : Field x :: (!((r==this && f == C.p2_init) || ( -
,!r==this && f == C.p1_init)) ==>
Heap[r, f] == oldHeap[r, f]));
//body
preHeap := Heap;
//          call worker1_nish
preHeap2 := Heap;
that := this;
assert Permission[this, C.p1_init] > 0.0;
p1_init := Heap[this, C.p1_init];
//precondition worker1_nish
assert p1_init == Heap[that, C.gp1];
assert Permission[that, C.gp1] >= 0.5;
Permission[that, C.gp1] := Permission[that, C.gp1]   0.5;
//postcondition worker1_nish
if (Permission[that, C.a] == 0.0)
{
havoc Heap_tmp;
Heap[that, C.a] := Heap_tmp[that, C.a];
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}
Permission[that, C.a] := Permission[that, C.a] + p1_init;
//po := p1_init + p2_init
assert Permission[this, C.po] == 1.0 && Permission[this, C.p1_init] > 0.0  -
,!&& Permission[this, C.p2_init] > 0.0;
Heap[this, C.po] := Heap[this, C.p1_init] + Heap[this, C.p2_init];
//postcondition worker2_nish
assert Heap[this, C.po] == preHeap[this, C.p1_init] + preHeap[this,  -
,!C.p2_init];
assert Permission[this, C.a] >= Heap[this, C.po];
Permission[this, C.a] := Permission[this, C.a]   Heap[this, C.po];
assert Permission[this, C.po] == 1.0;
Permission[this, C.po] := Permission[this, C.po]   1.0;
assert Permission[this, C.p1_init] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.p1_init] := Permission[this, C.p1_init]   0.5;
assert Permission[this, C.p2_init] >= 0.5;
Permission[this, C.p2_init] := Permission[this, C.p2_init]   0.5;
goto Done_worker2_nish;
Done_worker2_nish:
//test C
assert Permission[this, C.a] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp1] == 0.0;
assert Permission[this, C.gp2] == 1.0;
}
}
Listing A.2: Translation of scenario 3 in Boogie
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